European health care systems are facing diverse challenges. In health policy, strong primary care is seen as key to deal with these challenges. European countries differ in how strong their primary care systems are. Two groups of traditionally weak primary care systems are distinguished. First a...

Although the concept of healthcare renunciation is regularly employed in health surveys and increasingly called into the French public debate, it has never been subject to methodological questioning to analyse the term’s underlying significations. If health surveys frequently refer to...

We study the psycho-social determinants of self-assessed health in order to explain social inequalities in health in France.We use a unique general population survey to assess the respective impact on self-assessed health status of subjective perceptions of social capital, social support, and...

Objectives Since 2006 France experiences an innovative version of Gate-keeping which aims at regulating access to outpatient specialist care. We describe the reform's initial objectives, the political pathway which lead to the implementation of a reshaped reform and discuss the first outcomes...

La France, bien que pourvue d’un système de protection sociale à vocation universelle, connaît des inégalités sociales dans l’accès et l’utilisation des services de santé. L’analyse des déterminants du renoncement aux soins pour raisons financières apporte un nouvel éclairage...

We characterize the competitive equilibrium on the credit market when borrowers can strategically default. We assume that the audit is subject of errors of the two types and that lenders cannot commit ex-ante. We determine the penalty, the loan rate, the audit and strategic default...

In this note, we generalize the results obtained by Barday and Lesur (2005) by considering a bivariated non separable utility function. We characterize optimal health insurance contracts. Moreover, we show that under moral hazard a sufficiently high risk aversion implies that the optimal...

In this note, we intend to characterize conditions such that adverse selection is irrelevant in health insurance. We show that a condition is that policyholders health status is sufficiently reduced by illness.

We analyze a Principal-Agent model of an insurer who faces an adverse selection problem. He is unable to observe if his client has a high risk or a low risk of having an accident. At the underwriting of the contract, the insurer requests the client to declare his risk. After that, the former can...