Similar Search Results

J.-F. Mertens (1946-2012) : Des jeux répétés a l'analyse "coùt-bénéfice"

Forges, Françoise - Université Paris-Dauphine (Paris IX) - 2013

them today. Along with about 80 articles, Mertens's topics go from the formulation of Bayesian decision making in games … others, the selection of Nash equilibria in noncooperative games, the existence of solutions for stochastic games and the … extension of the Shapley value in cooperative games with infinitely many negligible agents. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011074149

The ex ante incentive compatible core of the assignement game

Forges, Françoise - Université Paris-Dauphine (Paris IX) - 2004

We consider two-sided matching markets in which agents have private information on a state of nature which determines the agents' utilities of matching. Monetary transfers are allowed and utility functions are quasi-linear. The model thus extends the assignment game introduced by Shapley and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010905077

Transfer Rate Rules and Core Selections in NTU Games

Iehlé, Vincent - Université Paris-Dauphine (Paris IX) - 2004

core allocations in NTU games with different concepts of robustness. Within a unified approach, we deduce the existence of …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010905124

Sustainability in a Multiproduct and Multiple Agent Contestable Market

Iehlé, Vincent - Université Paris-Dauphine (Paris IX) - 2009

market and where demands react to prices. The approach makes use of cooperative games to deduce the main results under …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010905176

Tarifications stables dans les monopoles multiproduits avec marchés séparés

Iehlé, Vincent - Université Paris-Dauphine (Paris IX) - 2004

use of parameterized cores of games with side payments to characterize subsidy free and sustainable pricings. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010905237

Stable pricing in monopoly and equilibrium-core of cost games.

Iehlé, Vincent - Université Paris-Dauphine (Paris IX) - 2004

modelled in terms of equilibrium-core allocations of parameterized cost games. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010905384

Payoff-dependant Balancedness and Cores

Bonnisseau, Jean-Marc; Iehlé, Vincent - Université Paris-Dauphine (Paris IX) - 2007

the selection of specific core payoff vectors. Lastly, the class of parameterized cooperative games is introduced. This …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010905386

The lattice structure of the S-Lorenz core

Iehlé, Vincent - Université Paris-Dauphine (Paris IX) - 2015

. As immediate corollaries, we obtain complementary results to the findings of Dutta and Ray (Games Econ Behav, 3 …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011228181

Cores of effectivity functions and implementation theory

Moulin, Hervé; Peleg, B. - Université Paris-Dauphine (Paris IX) - 1982

In a committee where cooperative voting occurs, effectivity functions describe the blocking power of coalitions. It is a binary relation that says for each coalition T and each subset of outcomes B whether or not T can force the final outcome within B. The corresponding cooperative stability...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010765456

Incentive compatible core and competitive equilibria in differential information economies

Forges, Françoise; Heifetz, Aviad; Minelli, Enrico - Université Paris-Dauphine (Paris IX) - 2001

If the allocations of a differential information economy are defined as incentive compatible state-contingent lotteries over consumption goods, competitive equilibrium allocations exist and belong to the (ex ante incentive) core. Furthermore, any competitive equilibrium allocation can be viewed...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010706418