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The ex ante incentive compatible core of the assignement game
Forges, Françoise - Université Paris-Dauphine (Paris IX) - 2004
We consider two-sided matching markets in which agents have private information on a state of nature which determines the agents' utilities of matching. Monetary transfers are allowed and utility functions are quasi-linear. The model thus extends the assignment game introduced by Shapley and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010905077
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Honest signalling in trust interactions: smiles rated as genuine induce trust and signal higher earnings opportunities
Centorrino, Samuele; Djemaï, Elodie; Hopfensitz, Astrid; … - Université Paris-Dauphine (Paris IX) - 2015
We test the hypothesis that smiles perceived as honest serve as a signal that has evolved to induce cooperation in situations requiring mutual trust. Potential trustees (84 participants from Toulouse, France) made two video clips averaging around 15 seconds for viewing by potential senders...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011115220
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Cores of effectivity functions and implementation theory
Moulin, Hervé; Peleg, B. - Université Paris-Dauphine (Paris IX) - 1982
are an example. This proves to be closely related to implementation by means of the strong equilibrium concept. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010765456
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Transfer Rate Rules and Core Selections in NTU Games
Iehlé, Vincent - Université Paris-Dauphine (Paris IX) - 2004
rate rule equilibrium under a dependent balancedness assumption. It shall turn out to be manipulable tools for selecting …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010905124
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Sustainability in a Multiproduct and Multiple Agent Contestable Market
Iehlé, Vincent - Université Paris-Dauphine (Paris IX) - 2009
We prove that a natural monopoly can set subsidy free pricing and sustainable pricing schedules in general economic environment. The setting is a multiproduct and multiple agent contestable market where demands are elastic and where rivals can enter the sub-markets composed by a set of the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010905176
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Tarifications stables dans les monopoles multiproduits avec marchés séparés
Iehlé, Vincent - Université Paris-Dauphine (Paris IX) - 2004
We provide some existence results of stable pricings for natural monopoly as defined in the theory of contestable markets. The main addings are based on the assumption of separated markets and the possibilities of entries. We borrow tools from cooperative game theory. Following the work of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010905237
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Stable pricing in monopoly and equilibrium-core of cost games.
Iehlé, Vincent - Université Paris-Dauphine (Paris IX) - 2004
modelled in terms of equilibrium-core allocations of parameterized cost games. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010905384
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Payoff-dependant Balancedness and Cores
Bonnisseau, Jean-Marc; Iehlé, Vincent - Université Paris-Dauphine (Paris IX) - 2007
transfer rate mappings. We also define a new equilibrium condition on transfer rates and we prove the existence of core payoff … vectors satisfying this condition. The additional requirement of transfer rate equilibrium refines the core concept and allows … new setting and its associated equilibrium–core solution extend the usual cooperative game framework and core solution to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010905386
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Negishi et les fondements de la concurrence
Bernard, Philippe; Wittwer, Jérôme - Université Paris-Dauphine (Paris IX) - 2002
In several papers, Negishi revisted the foundations of competitition. Sensitive to the Edgeworthian views of exchange but strongly influenced by the law of indifference of Jevons, he tried to reconcile both approaches. The main result of this synthesis is the equivalence between the walrasian...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011072057
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International Environmental Agreements: The Case of Costly Monetary Transfers
Bayramoglu, Basak; Jacques, Jean-François - Université Paris-Dauphine (Paris IX) - 2014
negotiation game and the generalized Nash bargaining solution (Nash in Econometrica 21:128–140, 1953) as the equilibrium. For …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011073100