We develop a "welfarist" model in which the collective demand for health insurance is mainly explained by a solvability motive : health insurance does not have for principal function to treat the risk aversion of solvent agents but to make it possible to individuals who are too poor to assume...

En France, malgré le rôle prépondérant de l’assurance maladie obligatoire au financement des dépenses de santé (75,9% en moyenne en 2012), l’accès aux soins est fortement dépendant de la possession d’un contrat d’assurance complémentaire santé, et de sa qualité, dont 5% de la...

In this paper, we want to characterize the optimal health insurance contract with adverse selection and moral hazard. We assume that policyholders differ by the permanent health status loss and choose an unobservable preventive effort in order to reduce the probability of illness which is...

This paper investigates the impact of health risk on insurance contract with hazard moral. We use a bi-dimensional utility function (wealth and health status). We prove that the type of health risk influences the equilibrium of insurance market. A full coverage is possible with moral hazard....

In this note, we generalize the results obtained by Barday and Lesur (2005) by considering a bivariated non separable utility function. We characterize optimal health insurance contracts. Moreover, we show that under moral hazard a sufficiently high risk aversion implies that the optimal...

Lifelong immunoglobulin replacement is the standard, expensive therapy for severe primary antibody deficiencies. This treatment can be administrated either by intravenous immunoglobulin (IVIG) or subcutaneous infusions (SCIG) and delivered at home or in an out-patient setting. This study aims to...