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Klemperer, Paul - Department of Economics, Oxford University - 2000

economic settings that do not, at first sight, look like auctions. We also discuss some more obvious applications, especially …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010605125

Some Observations on the British and German 3G Telecom Auctions

Klemperer, Paul - Department of Economics, Oxford University - 2002

I suggest explanations for the apparently puzzling bidding in the year 2000 British and German 3G telecom auctions …. This paper bundles my comments on two papers presented at the December 2001 CES Ifo conference on the telecom auctions …. (For those readers new to the subject, I recommend first reading How (Not) to Run Auctions: the European 3G Telecom …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010605188

Evolutionary Dynamics and Fast Convergence in the Assignment Game

Pradelski, Bary S.R. - Department of Economics, Oxford University - 2014

We study decentralized learning dynamics for the classic assignment game with transferable utility. At random points in time firms and workers match, break up, and re-match in the sesarch for better opportunities. We propose a simple learning process in which players have no knowledge about...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011071726

Evolutionary dynamics and equitable core selection in assignment games

Nax, Heinrich H.; Pradelski, Bary S.R. - Department of Economics, Oxford University - 2012

We study evolutionary dynamics in assignment games where many agents interact anonymously at virtually no cost. The process is decentralized, very little information is available and trade takes place at many different prices simultaneously. We propose a completely uncoupled learning process...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011004342

Bargaining and social structure

Gallo, Edoardo - Department of Economics, Oxford University - 2009

This paper presents a bargaining model between individuals belonging to different groups where the equilibrium outcome depends on the communication network within each group. Belonging to a group gives an informational advantage: connections help to gather information about past transactions...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004982009

Optimal Stalling While Bargaining

Thanassoulis, John - Department of Economics, Oxford University - 2005

Why do people stall while bargaining? Why are people keen to conclude a deal quickly, only to subsequently allow delay before the pie is realised? We propose that the reason is not fully explained by discount rates in combination with agents being engaged in a signalling equilibrium with...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005090621

Matching with Contracts: An Efficient Marriage Market?

Zeng, Chloe Qianzi - Department of Economics, Oxford University - 2012

This paper studies a marriage market with two-sided information asymmetry in whichthe gains from marriage are stochastic. Contracts specify divisions of ex-post realizedmarital surplus. I first study a game in which one side of the matching market offerscontracts. I show that when expected...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011133064

Modelling Transactions with Ultimatum Games: An Experiment on Certification

Guerra, Gerardo A. - Department of Economics, Oxford University - 2002

Ultimatum games have been extensively used in experimental studies. By studying the consequences that restrictions shared by ultimatum games have in subject`s behaviour, this paper argues that some results are falsified by design constraints. This paper also presets a taxonomy of certification,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010604902

Crowding Out Trust: The Adverse Effects of Verification. An Experiment

Guerra, Gerardo A. - Department of Economics, Oxford University - 2002

Through an experiment this study investigates the effects that verification has on honest traders. This paper demonstrates that by reducing the scope for trust verification can have a negative effect on the behaviour of honest individuals. Specifically, the analysis shows that trustworthy agents...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010605085

Dynamic Interactive Epistemology

Board, Oliver - Department of Economics, Oxford University - 2002

The epistemic program in game theory uses formal models of interactive reasoning to provide foundations for various game-theoretic solution concepts. Much of this work is based around the (static) Aumann structure model of interactive epistemology, but more recently dynamic models of interactive...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005047723