managers. We question this view within its own analytical framework by studying, in a principal-agent model, the effects of … diversion overlooks a significant cost of such behavior. Many common modes of compensation can provide managers with incentives …

executive officers. However, firms are run by teams of managers, and a theory of the firm should also explain the distribution …

Stock-based compensation is the standard solution to agency problems between shareholders and managers. In a dynamic … managers to work harder, it also induces them to hide any worsening of the firm's investment opportunities by following largely …-valued while managers hide the bad news to shareholders. We find that a firm-specific compensation package based on both stock and …

This paper presents theory and evidence on horizontal industry structure, focusing on situations where plant …

Firms are more complicated than standard principal-agent theory allows: firms have assets-in-place; firms endure … through time, allowing for the possibility of replacing a shirking manager; firms have many managers, constraining the amount …

: reducing the opportunity for managers to transfer value to equityholders from creditors via strategic default, and reducing the …

We derive a measure that captures the extent to which overlapping ownership structures shift managers' incentives to …