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Stackelberg equilibria in managerial delegation games
Berr, Fabian - In: European journal of operational research : EJOR 212 (2011) 2, pp. 251-262
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009010112
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Adding tournament to tournament : combining between-team and within-team incentives
Majerczyk, Michael; Sheremeta, Roman M.; Tian, Yu - In: Journal of economic behavior & organization : JEBO 166 (2019), pp. 1-11
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012148971
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Friends or foes? : optimal incentives for reciprocal agents
Livio, Luca; De Chiara, Alessandro - In: Journal of economic behavior & organization : JEBO 167 (2019), pp. 245-278
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012149701
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Do managers work harder in competitive industries?
Graziano, Clara - In: Journal of economic behavior & organization : JEBO 34 (1998) 3, pp. 489-498
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001238171
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Work hard, not smart : stock options in executive compensation
Barron, John M.; Waddell, Glen R. - In: Journal of economic behavior & organization : JEBO 66 (2008) 3/4, pp. 767-790
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003718212
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When to fire bad managers : the role of collusion between management and board of directors
Beetsma, Roel; Peters, Hans J. M.; Rebers, Eugène - In: Journal of economic behavior & organization : JEBO 42 (2000) 4, pp. 427-444
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001487342
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Determinants of management compensation with risk-adverse agents and dispersed ownership of the firm
Kraft, Kornelius; Niederprüm, Antonia - In: Journal of economic behavior & organization : JEBO 40 (1999) 1, pp. 17-27
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001411378
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Managerial Value Diversion and Shareholder Wealth
Bebchuk, Lucian A. - 2008
managers. We question this view within its own analytical framework by studying, in a principal-agent model, the effects of … diversion overlooks a significant cost of such behavior. Many common modes of compensation can provide managers with incentives …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012774878
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Executive Compensation and the Optimality of Managerial Entrenchment
Gorton, Gary B. - 2008
Firms are more complicated than standard principal-agent theory allows: firms have assets-in-place; firms endure … through time, allowing for the possibility of replacing a shirking manager; firms have many managers, constraining the amount …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012774972
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Executive Compensation : A Survey of Theory and Evidence
Edmans, Alex - 2017
This paper reviews the theoretical and empirical literature on executive compensation. We start by presenting data on the level of CEO and other top executive pay over time and across firms, the changing composition of pay; and the strength of executive incentives. We compare pay in U.S. public...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012951861