We present a purification result for incomplete information games with a large finite number of players that allows for compact metric spaces of actions and types. This result is then used to generalize the purfication theorems of Schmeidler (1973), Rashid (1983) and Kalai (2004). Our proofs are...

We establish the existence of sequential equilibria in general menu games, known to be suffcient to analyze common agency problems. In particular, we show that our result solves some unpleasant features of early approaches

We consider a two-player game in which one player can take a costly action (i.e., to provide a favor) that is benefcial to the other. The game is infnitely repeated and each player is equally likely to be the one who can provide the favor in each period. In this context, equality matching is...

Radzik (1991) showed that two-player games on compact intervals of the real line have { equilibria for all greater than 0, provided that payo functions are upper semicontinuous and strongly quasi-concave. In an attempt to generalize this theorem, Ziad (1997) stated that the same is true for...

We consider anonymous games with a Lebesgue space of players in which either the action space or players' characteristics are denumerable. Our main result shows that the set of equilibrium distributions over actions coincides with the set of distributions induced by equilibrium strategies. This...

We consider games with a continuum of players and intermediate preferences. We show that any such game has a Nash equilibrium that induces a partition of the set of attributes into a bounded number of convex sets with the following property: all players with an attribute in the interior of the...

We consider an asymptotic version of Mas-Colells theorem on the existence of pure strategy Nash equilibria in large games. Our result states that, if players payoff functions are selected from an equicontinuous family, then all sufficiently large games have an " pure, " equilibrium for all " 0....

We consider anonymous games with a Lebesgue space of players in which either the action space or players' characteristics are denumer- able. Our main result shows that the set of equilibrium distributions over actions coincides with the set of distributions induced by equilib- rium strategies....

Radzik (1991) showed that two-player games on compact intervals of the real line have " { equilibria for all " 0, provided that payo® functions are upper semicontinuous and strongly quasi-concave. In an attempt to generalize this theorem, Ziad (1997) stated that the same is true for n-player...