Showing 1 - 10 of 49
We examine a new class of games, which we call social games, where players not only choose strategies but also choose … players in different roles, among other things. We also examine finite repetitions of games where players may choose to … rematch in any period. Some equilibria of fixed-player repeated games cannot be sustained as equilibria in a repeated social …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005062336
We introduce a non-cooperative model of bargaining when players are divided into coalitions. The model is a modification of the mechanism in Vidal-Puga (Economic Theory, 2005) so that all the players have the same chances to make proposals. This means that players maintain their own 'right to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005550887
The mechanism by Hart and Mas-Colell (1996) for NTU games is generalized so that a coalition structure among players is … taken into account. The new mechanism yields the Owen value for TU games with coalition structure as well as the consistent … value (Maschler and Owen 1989, 1992) for NTU games with trivial coalition structure. Furthermore, we obtain a solution for …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005550900
abstract games and an example from epidemiology. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005550903
The Suppes-Sen dominance relation is a weak and widely accepted criterion of distributive justice. We propose its application to Nash bargaining theory. The Nash Bargaining Solution (NBS) is characterised by replacing the contriversial Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives axiom with an axiom...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005550913
the no-exodus equilibrium for games whose feasible sets are not monotonic. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005550914
simulations of simple games where the conclusions coincide or are less sensitive to behavioural assump-tions. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005550950
Shapley proved the existence of an ordinal, symmetric and efficient solution for three-player bargaining problems. Ordinality refers to the covariance of the solution with respect to order-preserving transformations of utilities. The construction of this solution is based on a special feature of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005550955
coincides with the Shapley value for convex games. Moreover, for 3-player games the selective marginal contributions vectors …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005124854
It is well known since Owen (Management Science, 1968) that the weights in the weighted Shapley value cannot be interpreted as a measure of power (i.e. of the ability to bargain) of the players. This paper proposes a new weight scheme for the Shapley value. Weights in this framework have to be...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005407525