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Collusive stability with relative performance and network externalities

Lu, Yi-Shan; Tsai, Chien-Shu; Lee, Jen Yao; Lee, Chung-Yang - In: Games 15 (2024) 3, pp. 1-7

In this paper, we aim to investigate the collusive stability in the presence of network externalities among firms with relative performance in the firm's objective functions. We demonstrate that collusive stability is increasing (decreasing) in the degree of relative performance, product...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014636244

Price competition with differentiated products on a two-dimensional plane : the impact of partial cartel on firms' profits and behavior

Stoykov, Stanislav; Kostov, Ivan - In: Games 14 (2023) 2, pp. 1-25

A numerical procedure capable of obtaining the equilibrium states of oligopoly markets under several assumptions is … and any location of the firms. Four scenarios of oligopoly markets were developed by combining both strategies from one … side and competitive behavior and a partial cartel agreement from another side. The main differences between the scenarios …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014422280

Is voting for a cartel a sign of cooperativeness?

Gillet, Joris - In: Games 12 (2021) 2, pp. 1-10

agreements - lead to higher prices in a Bertrand oligopoly could be because of a selection effect: decision-makers who are …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012547790

Cartel formation in Cournot competition with asymmetric costs : a partition function approach

Abe, Takaaki - In: Games 12 (2021) 1/14, pp. 1-16

In this paper, we use a partition function form game to analyze cartel formation among firms in Cournot competition. We … level of the cost advantage is "moderate", then the firm with the cost advantage leads the cartel formation among the firms …. Moreover, if the cost advantage is relatively high, then the formed cartel can also be stable in the sense of the core of a …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012432603

Network externalities and downstream collusion under asymmetric costs : a note

Lee, Jen Yao; Fan, Chen-Chia; Tsai, Chien-Shu - In: Games 14 (2023) 2, pp. 1-11

This paper considers the collusive stability of downstream competition in a vertical market with network externalities and cost asymmetry. A dynamic collusion game is constructed, and backward induction is employed to solve the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. We show that larger network...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014422321

Sharing price announcements

Janssen, Maarten C. W.; Karamychev, Vladimir A. - In: Games 16 (2025) 2, pp. 1-25

We present a simple model where, before competing in prices, firms announce which prices they intend to choose. Deviating from these announcements involves a cost. We show that sharing pricing intentions results in prices being set above their competitive levels. All equilibria result in prices...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015408259

Efficient decentralized leadership under hybrid work and attachment to regions

Aoyama, Naoto; Silva, Emilson C. D. - In: Games 14 (2023) 2, pp. 1-18

Under the 'new normal' in the labor market, individuals can work remotely or in person, a hybrid work mode that became ubiquitous during the pandemic. This paper studies the efficiency of decentralized leadership in federations in which hybrid work is the modus operandi. Self-interested regional...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014422292

Cournot's oligopoly equilibrium under different expectations and differentiated production

Grisáková, Nora; Štetka, Peter - In: Games 13 (2022) 6, pp. 1-17

competition known as the Cournot oligopoly model. Firms and their production are differentiated, which brings the theoretical … operators in Slovakia was selected as a real market case with accessible data on an oligopoly with three companies and partial …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014418202

The optimality of team contracts

Barlo, Mehmet; Özdoğan, Ayça - In: Games 4 (2013) 4, pp. 670-689

This paper analyzes optimal contracts in a linear hidden-action model with normally distributed returns possessing two moments that are governed jointly by two agents who have negative exponential utilities. They can observe and verify each others’ effort levels and draft enforceable...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010240825

The two-stage game approach to coalition formation : where we stand and ways to go

Hagen, Achim; Mouche, Pierre H. M. van; Weikard, Hans-Peter - In: Games 11 (2020) 1/3, pp. 1-31

to the case of a symmetric physical game. Various theoretical results, in particular, for cartel games, are provided. As …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012168611