The optimality of team contracts
Year of publication: |
2013
|
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Authors: | Barlo, Mehmet ; Özdoğan, Ayça |
Published in: |
Games. - Basel : MDPI, ISSN 2073-4336, ZDB-ID 2527220-2. - Vol. 4.2013, 4, p. 670-689
|
Subject: | principal-agent problems | linear contracts | collusion | team | decentralization | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Arbeitsgruppe | Team | Moral Hazard | Moral hazard | Vertragstheorie | Contract theory | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive |
Type of publication: | Article |
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Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
Language: | English |
Notes: | Systemvoraussetzung: Acrobat Reader |
Other identifiers: | 10.3390/g4040670 [DOI] hdl:10419/98497 [Handle] |
Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
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