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The renegotiation-proofness principle and costly renegotiation

Brennan, James R.; Watson, Joel - In: Games 4 (2013) 3, pp. 347-366

We study contracting and costly renegotiation in settings of complete, but unverifiable information, using the mechanism-design approach. We show how renegotiation activity is best modeled in the fundamentals of the mechanism-design framework, so that noncontractibility of renegotiation amounts...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010369410

Contract and game theory: Basic concepts for settings with finite horizons

Watson, Joel - In: Games 4 (2013) 3, pp. 457-496

the model, players alternately engage in contract negotiation and take individual actions. A notion of contractual … relationship. In particular, the model shows the importance of accounting for the self-enforced component of contract in the … negotiation process. Examples and guidance for applications are provided, along with existence results and a result on a monotone …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010369438

Bargaining mechanisms for one-way games

Abeliuk, Andrés; Berbeglia, Gerardo; Van Hentenryck, Pascal - In: Games 6 (2015) 3, pp. 347-367

We introduce one-way games, a two-player framework whose distinguishable feature is that the private payoff of one (independent) player is determined only by her own strategy and does not depend on the actions taken by the other (dependent) player. We show that the equilibrium outcome in one-way...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011380868

Bargaining over strategies of non-cooperative Games

Attanasi, Giuseppe; García Gallego, Aurora; … - In: Games 6 (2015) 3, pp. 273-298

We propose a bargaining process supergame over the strategies to play in a non-cooperative game. The agreement reached by players at the end of the bargaining process is the strategy profile that they will play in the original non-cooperative game. We analyze the subgame perfect equilibria of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011316539

A tale of two bargaining solutions

Karagözoğlu, Emin; Keskin, Kerim - In: Games 6 (2015) 2, pp. 161-174

We set up a rich bilateral bargaining model with four salient points (disagreement point, ideal point, reference point, and tempered aspirations point), where the disagreement point and the utility possibilities frontier are endogenously determined. This model allows us to compare two bargaining...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011316643

Incomplete information about social preferences explains equal division and delay in bargaining

Kohler, Stefan - In: Games 3 (2012) 3, pp. 119-137

Two deviations of alternating-offer bargaining behavior from economic theory are observed together, yet have been studied separately. Players who could secure themselves a large surplus share if bargainers were purely self-interested incompletely exploit their advantage. Delay in agreement...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009754119

Auctioning the right to play ultimatum games and the impact on equilibrium selection

Shachat, Jason M.; Swarthout, J. Todd - In: Games 4 (2013) 4, pp. 738-753

We auction scarce rights to play the Proposer and Responder positions in ultimatum games. As a control treatment, we randomly allocate these rights and charge exogenous participation fees. These participation fee sequences match the auction price sequence from a session of the original...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010240820

Contract and game theory : basic concepts for settings with finite horizons

Watson, Joel - In: Games 4 (2013) 3, pp. 457-496

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009785335

An experimental analysis of asymmetric power in conflict bargaining

Sieber, Katri; Clark, David; Holt, Charles A.; … - In: Games 4 (2013) 3, pp. 375-397

Demands and concessions in a multi-stage bargaining process are shaped by the probabilities that each side will prevail in an impasse. Standard game-theoretic predictions are quite sharp: demands are pushed to the precipice with nothing left on the table, but there is no conflict regardless of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009785364

The renegotiation-proofness principle and costly renegotiation

Brennan, James R.; Watson, Joel - In: Games 4 (2013) 3, pp. 347-366

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009785372