The renegotiation-proofness principle and costly renegotiation
Year of publication: |
2013
|
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Authors: | Brennan, James R. ; Watson, Joel |
Published in: |
Games. - Basel : MDPI, ISSN 2073-4336, ZDB-ID 2527220-2. - Vol. 4.2013, 3, p. 347-366
|
Subject: | contract theory | bargaining | negotiation | mechanism design | Vertragstheorie | Contract theory | Verhandlungstheorie | Bargaining theory | Verhandlungen | Negotiations | Mechanismus-Design-Theorie | Mechanism design |
Extent: | graph. Darst. |
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Type of publication: | Article |
Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
Language: | English |
Other identifiers: | 10.3390/g4030347 [DOI] hdl:10419/98546 [Handle] |
Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
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