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On the Nash equilibria of a duel with terminal payoffs
Kehagias, Athanasios - In: Games 14 (2023) 5, pp. 1-12
We formulate and study a two-player duel game as a terminal payoffs stochastic game. Players 𝑃1,𝑃2 are standing in place and, in every turn, each may shoot at the other (in other words, abstention is allowed). If 𝑃𝑛 shoots 𝑃𝑚 (𝑚≠𝑛), either they hit and kill them (with...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014426539
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Cooperation between emotional players
Andersson, Lina - In: Games 11 (2020) 4/45, pp. 1-16
This paper uses the framework of stochastic games to propose a model of emotions in repeated interactions. An emotional player can be in either a friendly, a neutral, or a hostile state of mind. The player transitions between the states of mind as a response to observed actions taken by the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012432312
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Incentive magnitude effects in experimental games : bigger is not necessarily better
Pulford, Briony D.; Colman, Andrew M.; Loomes, Graham - In: Games 9 (2018) 1/4, pp. 1-10
In experimental games, task-related incentives are payments to experimental subjects that vary according to their …-form games under task-related incentives of conventional magnitude and compared them with choices and reasons in the same games … under incentives five times as large. Both strategy choices and self-reported reasons for choices were almost …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011848336
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Optimal incentives in a principal-agent model with endogenous technology
Marini, Marco; Polidori, Paolo; Teobaldelli, Désirée; … - In: Games 9 (2018) 1/6, pp. 1-13
One of the standard predictions of the agency theory is that more incentives can be given to agents with lower risk … obtain that lower agent’s risk aversion unambiguously leads to higher incentives when the technology function linking …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011848346
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The optimal contract under adverse selection in a moral-hazard model with a risk-averse agent
Maréchal, François; Thomas, Lionel - In: Games 9 (2018) 1/12, pp. 1-22
satisfy because of the different kinds of incentives to be managed and the overall trade-off between rent extraction …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011849217
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Mean-field type games between two players driven by backward stochastic differential equations
Aurell, Alexander - In: Games 9 (2018) 4/88, pp. 1-26
In this paper, mean-field type games between two players with backward stochastic dynamics are defined and studied. They make up a class of non-zero-sum, non-cooperating, differential games where the players’ state dynamics solve backward stochastic differential equations (BSDE) that depend on...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012014876
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A stochastic characterization of the capture zone in pursuit-evasion games
Battistini, Simone - In: Games 11 (2020) 4/54, pp. 1-10
Pursuit-evasion games are used to define guidance strategies for multi-agent planning problems. Although optimal strategies exist for deterministic scenarios, in the case when information about the opponent players is imperfect, it is important to evaluate the effect of uncertainties on the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012432389
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Team incentives under moral and altruistic preferences : wich team to choose?
Sarkisian, Roberto - In: Games 8 (2017) 3, pp. 1-24
This paper studies incentives provision when agents are characterized either by homo moralis preferences, i.e., their … incentives decreases with the degrees of morality and altruism displayed by the agents, thus leading to increased profits for the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011771132
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The optimality of team contracts
Barlo, Mehmet; Özdoğan, Ayça - In: Games 4 (2013) 4, pp. 670-689
This paper analyzes optimal contracts in a linear hidden-action model with normally distributed returns possessing two moments that are governed jointly by two agents who have negative exponential utilities. They can observe and verify each others’ effort levels and draft enforceable...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010240825
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Optimal incentives schemes under homo moralis preferences
Sarkisian, Roberto - In: Games 12 (2021) 1/28, pp. 1-22
This study focuses on the optimal incentive schemes in a multi-agent moral hazard model, where each agent has other-regarding preferences and an individual measure of output, with both being observable by the principal. In particular, the two agents display homo moralis preferences. I find that,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012493322