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The power of requests in a redistribution game : an experimental study

Pedersini, Riccardo; Nagel, Rosemarie; Le Menestrel, Marc - In: Games 10 (2019) 3/27, pp. 1-18

decay over time. In a new setup we introduce non-enforceable sharing rules, as requests, in a repeated redistribution game …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012062386

Salience bias and overwork

Römeis, Fabio; Herweg, Fabian; Müller, Daniel - In: Games 13 (2022) 1, pp. 1-22

In this study, we enrich a standard principal-agent model with hidden action by introducing salience-biased perception on the agent's side. The agent's misguided focus on salient payoffs, which leads the agent's and the principal's probability assessments to diverge, has two effects: First, the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013172380

The optimal contract under adverse selection in a moral-hazard model with a risk-averse agent

Maréchal, François; Thomas, Lionel - In: Games 9 (2018) 1/12, pp. 1-22

This paper studies the optimal contract offered by a risk-neutral principal to a risk-averse agent when the agent’s hidden ability and action both improve the probability of the project being successful. We show that if the agent is sufficiently prudent and able, the principal induces a higher...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011849217

The optimality of team contracts

Barlo, Mehmet; Özdoğan, Ayça - In: Games 4 (2013) 4, pp. 670-689

This paper analyzes optimal contracts in a linear hidden-action model with normally distributed returns possessing two moments that are governed jointly by two agents who have negative exponential utilities. They can observe and verify each others’ effort levels and draft enforceable...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010240825

Optimal incentives schemes under homo moralis preferences

Sarkisian, Roberto - In: Games 12 (2021) 1/28, pp. 1-22

This study focuses on the optimal incentive schemes in a multi-agent moral hazard model, where each agent has other-regarding preferences and an individual measure of output, with both being observable by the principal. In particular, the two agents display homo moralis preferences. I find that,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012493322

Optimal incentives in a principal-agent model with endogenous technology

Marini, Marco; Polidori, Paolo; Teobaldelli, Désirée; … - In: Games 9 (2018) 1/6, pp. 1-13

One of the standard predictions of the agency theory is that more incentives can be given to agents with lower risk aversion. In this paper, we show that this relationship may be absent or reversed when the technology is endogenous and projects with a higher efficiency are also riskier. Using a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011848346

Team incentives under moral and altruistic preferences : wich team to choose?

Sarkisian, Roberto - In: Games 8 (2017) 3, pp. 1-24

This paper studies incentives provision when agents are characterized either by homo moralis preferences, i.e., their utility is represented by a convex combination of selfish preferences and Kantian morality, or by altruism. In a moral hazard in a team setting with two agents whose efforts...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011771132

The optimal contract under adverse selection in a moral-hazard model with a risk-averse agent

Maréchal, François; Thomas, Lionel - In: Games 9 (2018) 1, pp. 1-22

This paper studies the optimal contract offered by a risk-neutral principal to a risk-averse agent when the agent's hidden ability and action both improve the probability of the project being successful. We show that if the agent is sufficiently prudent and able, the principal induces a higher...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011852728

Salience bias and overwork

Römeis, Fabio; Herweg, Fabian; Müller, Daniel - In: Games 13 (2022) 1, pp. 1-22

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013200172

On the collective choice among models of social protection : an experimental study

Farina, Francesco; Ottone, Stefania; Ponzano, Ferruccio - In: Games 10 (2019) 4/41, pp. 1-17

A real-effort experiment is conducted in order to detect preferences for one out of three different models of the … Welfare State characterized by different tax-and-transfer schemes. We reproduce a small society in the lab where: Subjects are …-effort activity; income and risk are assigned according to the class; tax revenue is spent to refund unlucky people and to provide a …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012167864

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