Showing 1 - 10 of 125
We offer complete characterizations of the equilibrium outcomes of two prominent agenda voting institutions that are … equivalently the Euro-Latin procedure. Our axiomatic approach provides a proper understanding of these voting institutions, and … allows comparisons between them, and with other voting procedures. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010931198
interests or direct benefits from voting. The theoretical value of participating in the vote is therefore zero if subjects have … the vote and that they do so for instrumental reasons. The observed voting premium in the main treatment is high and can … model of instrumental voting, which assumes that individuals are overconfident and that they overestimate the errors of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049763
We introduce a framework of electoral competition in which voters have general preferences over candidatesʼ immutable characteristics (such as gender, race or previously committed policy positions) as well as their policy positions, which are flexible. Candidates are uncertain about the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049805
We study the competitive equilibrium of a market for votes where the choice is binary and it is known that a majority of the voters supports one of the two alternatives. Voters can trade votes for a numeraire before making a decision via majority rule. We identify a sufficient condition...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011117141
When members of a voting body exhibit single peaked preferences, pair-wise majority voting equilibria (Condorcet …) also proved that the result holds under single-peakedness, for a wide class of voting rules that includes the majority rule … and preserves a version of the median voter result for a large class of voting rules. We also show that top monotonicity …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049747
From the regulation of sports to lawmaking in parliament, in many situations one group of people (“agents”) make decisions that affect the payoffs of others (“principals”) who may offer action-contingent transfers in order to sway the agents' decisions. Prat and Rustichini (2003)...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012221614
We report on an experiment comparing compulsory and voluntary voting institutions in a voting game with common … preferences. Rational choice theory predicts sharp differences in voter behavior between these two institutions. If voting is … compulsory, then voters may find it rational to vote insincerely, i.e., against their private information. If voting is voluntary …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010753437
This paper studies a cheap talk model in which two senders having partial and non-overlapping private information simultaneously communicate with an uninformed receiver. The sensitivity of the receiverʼs ideal action to one senderʼs private information depends on the other senderʼs private...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049841
An aggregation rule maps each profile of individual strict preference orderings over a set of alternatives into a social ordering over that set. We call such a rule strategy-proof if misreporting one's preference never produces a different social ordering that is between the original ordering...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010906691
An apex game consists of one apex player and a set of minor players. We identify two key properties of apex games and use them to introduce the class of general apex games. We derive players' preferences over winning coalitions by applying strongly monotonic power indices on such a game and all...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010931190