Showing 1 - 10 of 26
An aggregation rule maps each profile of individual strict preference orderings over a set of alternatives into a social ordering over that set. We call such a rule strategy-proof if misreporting one's preference never produces a different social ordering that is between the original ordering...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010906691
An apex game consists of one apex player and a set of minor players. We identify two key properties of apex games and use them to introduce the class of general apex games. We derive players' preferences over winning coalitions by applying strongly monotonic power indices on such a game and all...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010931190
We offer complete characterizations of the equilibrium outcomes of two prominent agenda voting institutions that are widely used in the democratic world: the amendment, also known as the Anglo-American procedure, and the successive, or equivalently the Euro-Latin procedure. Our axiomatic...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010931198
We analyze the problem of a jury that must rank a set of contestants whose socially optimal ranking is common knowledge among jurors who may have friends among the contestants and may, therefore, be biased in their friends' favor. We show a natural mechanism that is finite and complete...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010931204
Suppose legislators represent districts of varying population, and their assembly's voting rule is intended to implement the principle of one person, one vote. How should legislators' voting weights appropriately reflect these population differences? An analysis requires an understanding of the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010753430
We describe and characterize the family of asymmetric parametric division rules for the adjudication of conflicting claims on a divisible homogeneous good. As part of the characterization, we present two novel axioms which restrict how a division rule indirectly allocates between different...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010753432
We consider full implementation in complete-information environments when agents have an arbitrarily small preference for honesty. We offer a condition called separable punishment and show that when it holds and there are at least two agents, any social choice function can be implemented by a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010738055
We study the problem of risk sharing within a household or syndicate. A household shares risky prospects using a social welfare functional. We characterize the social welfare functionals such that the household is collectively less risk averse than each member, and satisfies the Pareto principle...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010588267
We consider the problem of choosing a partition of a set of objects by a set of agents. The private information of each agent is a strict ordering over the set of partitions of the objects. A social choice function chooses a partition given the reported preferences of the agents. We impose a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010664593
We study resource allocation with multi-unit demand, such as the allocation of courses to students. In contrast to the case of single-unit demand, no stable mechanism, not even the (student-proposing) deferred acceptance algorithm, achieves desirable properties: it is not strategy-proof and the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010719484