Showing 1 - 6 of 6
This paper proposes new concepts of strong and coalition-proof correlated equilibria where agents form coalitions at the interim stage and share information about their recommendations in a credible way. When players deviate at the interim stage, coalition-proof correlated equilibria may fail to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005066693
This paper analyzes the formation of networks when players choose how much to invest in each relationship. We suppose that players have a fixed endowment that they can allocate across links, and in the baseline model, suppose that link strength is an additively separable and convex function of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005066761
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005408823
This paper investigates the effects of entry in two-sided markets where buyers and sellers act strategically. Applying new tools from supermodular optimization/games, sufficient conditions for different comparative statics results are obtained. While normality of one good is sufficient for the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005409087
We analyze the problem of optimal monopoly pricing in social networks where agents care about consumption or prices of their neighbors. We characterize the relation between optimal prices and consumersʼ centrality in the social network. This relation depends on the market structure (monopoly...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049859
This paper proposes axiomatic foundations of expectation formation rules, by which deviating players anticipate the reaction of external players in a partition function game. The projection rule is the only rule satisfying subset consistency and responsiveness to the original partition of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011117136