We study coordination in dynamic global games with private learning. Players choose whether and when to invest … tolerant of non-simultaneous coordination. We also identify conditions under which players coordinate on the risk …

multiple Pareto-ranked Nash equilibria in the game and the “coordination problem” refers to the fact that rational equilibrium …

individuals are able to coordinate on equilibria, but that coordination strongly depends on the network structure. Despite … frequent coordination failures, in graphs of size N=4 equilibrium play seems easier on network architectures with high (low …

This paper investigates the role of endogenous timing of decisions on coordination under asymmetric information. In the … equilibrium of a global coordination game, where players choose the timing of their decision, a player who has sufficiently high … coordination: a learning effect (early decisions reveal information) and a complementarity effect (early decisions eliminate …

: communication can be public, private or a mixture of both. Payoffs are assumed to be sensitive to unilateral deviations. First, for …

A sender wishes to transmit a secret to a receiver through a communication network, where some nodes are controlled by … an adversary. We characterize the directed networks for which there exist ε-secret and ε-strongly secure communication …

This paper shows that the efficiency bound for communication equilibria identified by Goltsman et al. (2009) in the …

We show that in multi-sender communication games where senders imperfectly observe the state, if the state space is … large, then even when the state is observed imperfectly, there are communication equilibria that are strictly better for the …