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Why votes have value: Instrumental voting with overconfidence and overestimation of others' errors

Dittmann, Ingolf; Kübler, Dorothea; Maug, Ernst; … - In: Games and Economic Behavior 84 (2014) C, pp. 17-38

interests or direct benefits from voting. The theoretical value of participating in the vote is therefore zero if subjects have … the vote and that they do so for instrumental reasons. The observed voting premium in the main treatment is high and can … model of instrumental voting, which assumes that individuals are overconfident and that they overestimate the errors of …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049763

Political competition between differentiated candidates

Krasa, Stefan; Polborn, Mattias K. - In: Games and Economic Behavior 76 (2012) 1, pp. 249-271

We introduce a framework of electoral competition in which voters have general preferences over candidatesʼ immutable characteristics (such as gender, race or previously committed policy positions) as well as their policy positions, which are flexible. Candidates are uncertain about the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049805

Democracy undone. Systematic minority advantage in competitive vote markets

Casella, Alessandra; Turban, Sébastien - In: Games and Economic Behavior 88 (2014) C, pp. 47-70

We study the competitive equilibrium of a market for votes where the choice is binary and it is known that a majority of the voters supports one of the two alternatives. Voters can trade votes for a numeraire before making a decision via majority rule. We identify a sufficient condition...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011117141

Oligopolistic competition in price and quality

Dubovik, Andrei; Janssen, Maarten C.W. - In: Games and Economic Behavior 75 (2012) 1, pp. 120-138

We consider an oligopolistic market where firms compete in price and quality and where consumers have heterogeneous information: some consumers know both the prices, and quality of the products offered, some know only the prices, and some know neither. We show that if there are sufficiently many...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010573668

Almost fully revealing cheap talk with imperfectly informed senders

Ambrus, Attila; Lu, Shih En - In: Games and Economic Behavior 88 (2014) C, pp. 174-189

We show that in multi-sender communication games where senders imperfectly observe the state, if the state space is large enough, then there can exist equilibria arbitrarily close to full revelation of the state as the noise in the senders' observations gets small. In the case of replacement...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011117135

Games played through agents in the laboratory — a test of Prat & Rustichini's model

Ensthaler, Ludwig; Huck, Steffen; Leutgeb, Johannes - In: Games and Economic Behavior 119 (2020), pp. 30-55

From the regulation of sports to lawmaking in parliament, in many situations one group of people (“agents”) make decisions that affect the payoffs of others (“principals”) who may offer action-contingent transfers in order to sway the agents' decisions. Prat and Rustichini (2003)...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012221614

Compulsory versus voluntary voting: An experimental study

Bhattacharya, Sourav; Duffy, John; Kim, Sun-Tak - In: Games and Economic Behavior 84 (2014) C, pp. 111-131

We report on an experiment comparing compulsory and voluntary voting institutions in a voting game with common … preferences. Rational choice theory predicts sharp differences in voter behavior between these two institutions. If voting is … compulsory, then voters may find it rational to vote insincerely, i.e., against their private information. If voting is voluntary …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010753437

Cheap talk with two senders and complementary information

McGee, Andrew; Yang, Huanxing - In: Games and Economic Behavior 79 (2013) C, pp. 181-191

This paper studies a cheap talk model in which two senders having partial and non-overlapping private information simultaneously communicate with an uninformed receiver. The sensitivity of the receiverʼs ideal action to one senderʼs private information depends on the other senderʼs private...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049841

Political Motivations and Electoral Competition : Equilibrium Analysis and Experimental Evidence

Drouvelis, Michalis - 2018

We study both theoretically and experimentally the set of Nash equilibria of a classical one-dimensional election game with two candidates. These candidates are interested in power and ideology, but their weights on these two motives are not necessarily identical. Apart from obtaining the well...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012933425

Ethics, welfare, and capital markets

Kanatas, George; Stefanadis, Christodoulos - In: Games and Economic Behavior 87 (2014) C, pp. 34-49

We examine implications of a society's cultural emphasis on moral sentiments. Entrepreneurs and investors interact in a game that entails both adverse selection and moral hazard; entrepreneurs may attempt to breach their contracts and expropriate investors. An agent is born into a particular...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010931185

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