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The optimal sorting of players in contests between groups

Ryvkin, Dmitry - In: Games and Economic Behavior 73 (2011) 2, pp. 564-572

We study how aggregate effort exerted in contests between groups of heterogeneous players depends on the sorting of … players into groups. We show that the optimal sorting depends on the curvature of the effort cost function. From the … steep effort cost function, the optimal sorting of players may be the one that maximizes the variation in ability across …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010573651

Costly information acquisition. Is it better to toss a coin?

Triossi, Matteo - In: Games and Economic Behavior 82 (2013) C, pp. 169-191

This paper presents a strategic model of common value elections with endogenous information acquisition. It proves that majoritarian elections can fail to aggregate information when voters have heterogeneous skills and provides necessary and sufficient conditions for information aggregation....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049772

Heterogeneous network games: Conflicting preferences

Hernández, Penélope; Muñoz-Herrera, Manuel; … - In: Games and Economic Behavior 79 (2013) C, pp. 56-66

of neighbors of the network. For high degrees of heterogeneity in the population the equilibria is such that every player …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049725

Minimax play by teams

Okano, Yoshitaka - In: Games and Economic Behavior 77 (2013) 1, pp. 168-180

We analyze the behavior of two-person teams and individuals who repeatedly play the game with a unique mixed strategy equilibrium in the laboratory. When teams play OʼNeillʼs 4×4 game against another team, the choice frequencies are consistent with equilibrium of the game at the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049773

Political Motivations and Electoral Competition : Equilibrium Analysis and Experimental Evidence

Drouvelis, Michalis - 2018

We study both theoretically and experimentally the set of Nash equilibria of a classical one-dimensional election game with two candidates. These candidates are interested in power and ideology, but their weights on these two motives are not necessarily identical. Apart from obtaining the well...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012933425

Overbidding and overspreading in rent-seeking experiments: Cost structure and prize allocation rules

Chowdhury, Subhasish M.; Sheremeta, Roman M.; Turocy, … - In: Games and Economic Behavior 87 (2014) C, pp. 224-238

We study experimentally the effects of cost structure and prize allocation rules on the performance of rent-seeking contests. Most previous studies use a lottery prize rule and linear cost, and find both overbidding relative to the Nash equilibrium prediction and significant variation of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010931195

A foundation for strategic agenda voting

Apesteguia, Jose; Ballester, Miguel A.; Masatlioglu, … - In: Games and Economic Behavior 87 (2014) C, pp. 91-99

We offer complete characterizations of the equilibrium outcomes of two prominent agenda voting institutions that are widely used in the democratic world: the amendment, also known as the Anglo-American procedure, and the successive, or equivalently the Euro-Latin procedure. Our axiomatic...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010931198

The Fragility of Information Aggregation in Large Elections

Mandler, Michael - 2013

In a common-values election where voters receive a signal about which candidate is superior, suppose there is a small amount of uncertainty about the likelihood of the signal's outcome, holding fixed the correct candidate. Once this uncertainty is resolved, the signal is i.i.d. across agents....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014213382

Characterization of the von Neumann–Morgenstern stable set in a non-cooperative model of dynamic policy-making with a persistent agenda setter

Diermeier, Daniel; Fong, Pohan - In: Games and Economic Behavior 76 (2012) 1, pp. 349-353

We generalize the dynamic bargaining game of Diermeier and Fong (2011) to arbitrary quota rules to provide a non-cooperative characterization of the von Neumann–Morgenstern stable set. Assuming that players are sufficiently patient and have strict preferences, a pure-strategy stationary...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010664596

The equivalence between costly and probabilistic voting models

Kamada, Yuichiro; Kojima, Fuhito - In: Games and Economic Behavior 80 (2013) C, pp. 179-185

In costly voting models, voters abstain when a stochastic cost of voting exceeds the benefit from voting. In probabilistic voting models, they always vote for a candidate who generates the highest utility, which is subject to random shocks. We prove an equivalence result: In two-candidate...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010666017

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