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Markov equilibria in a model of bargaining in networks
Abreu, Dilip; Manea, Mihai - In: Games and Economic Behavior 75 (2012) 1, pp. 1-16
MPEs for high discount factors is developed. For some networks, we find that all MPEs are asymptotically inefficient as …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010573659
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Stochastic stability in best shot network games
Boncinelli, Leonardo; Pin, Paolo - In: Games and Economic Behavior 75 (2012) 2, pp. 538-554
The best shot game applied to networks is a discrete model of many processes of contribution to local public goods. It …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010577244
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Pairwise epistemic conditions for Nash equilibrium
Bach, Christian W.; Tsakas, Elias - In: Games and Economic Behavior 85 (2014) C, pp. 48-59
We introduce a framework for modeling pairwise interactive beliefs and provide an epistemic foundation for Nash equilibrium in terms of pairwise epistemic conditions locally imposed on only some pairs of players. Our main result considerably weakens not only the standard sufficient conditions by...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010906693
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Why votes have value: Instrumental voting with overconfidence and overestimation of others' errors
Dittmann, Ingolf; Kübler, Dorothea; Maug, Ernst; … - In: Games and Economic Behavior 84 (2014) C, pp. 17-38
interests or direct benefits from voting. The theoretical value of participating in the vote is therefore zero if subjects have … the vote and that they do so for instrumental reasons. The observed voting premium in the main treatment is high and can … model of instrumental voting, which assumes that individuals are overconfident and that they overestimate the errors of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049763
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Political competition between differentiated candidates
Krasa, Stefan; Polborn, Mattias K. - In: Games and Economic Behavior 76 (2012) 1, pp. 249-271
We introduce a framework of electoral competition in which voters have general preferences over candidatesʼ immutable characteristics (such as gender, race or previously committed policy positions) as well as their policy positions, which are flexible. Candidates are uncertain about the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049805
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Democracy undone. Systematic minority advantage in competitive vote markets
Casella, Alessandra; Turban, Sébastien - In: Games and Economic Behavior 88 (2014) C, pp. 47-70
We study the competitive equilibrium of a market for votes where the choice is binary and it is known that a majority of the voters supports one of the two alternatives. Voters can trade votes for a numeraire before making a decision via majority rule. We identify a sufficient condition...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011117141
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Games played through agents in the laboratory — a test of Prat & Rustichini's model
Ensthaler, Ludwig; Huck, Steffen; Leutgeb, Johannes - In: Games and Economic Behavior 119 (2020), pp. 30-55
From the regulation of sports to lawmaking in parliament, in many situations one group of people (“agents”) make decisions that affect the payoffs of others (“principals”) who may offer action-contingent transfers in order to sway the agents' decisions. Prat and Rustichini (2003)...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012221614
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Compulsory versus voluntary voting: An experimental study
Bhattacharya, Sourav; Duffy, John; Kim, Sun-Tak - In: Games and Economic Behavior 84 (2014) C, pp. 111-131
We report on an experiment comparing compulsory and voluntary voting institutions in a voting game with common … preferences. Rational choice theory predicts sharp differences in voter behavior between these two institutions. If voting is … compulsory, then voters may find it rational to vote insincerely, i.e., against their private information. If voting is voluntary …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010753437
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Cheap talk with two senders and complementary information
McGee, Andrew; Yang, Huanxing - In: Games and Economic Behavior 79 (2013) C, pp. 181-191
This paper studies a cheap talk model in which two senders having partial and non-overlapping private information simultaneously communicate with an uninformed receiver. The sensitivity of the receiverʼs ideal action to one senderʼs private information depends on the other senderʼs private...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049841
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Sharing the cost of redundant items
Hougaard, Jens Leth; Moulin, Hervé - In: Games and Economic Behavior 87 (2014) C, pp. 339-352
We ask how to share the cost of finitely many public goods (items) among users with different needs: some smaller subsets of items are enough to serve the needs of each user, yet the cost of all items must be covered, even if this entails inefficiently paying for redundant items. Typical...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010931193