interests or direct benefits from voting. The theoretical value of participating in the vote is therefore zero if subjects have … the vote and that they do so for instrumental reasons. The observed voting premium in the main treatment is high and can … model of instrumental voting, which assumes that individuals are overconfident and that they overestimate the errors of …

When members of a voting body exhibit single peaked preferences, pair-wise majority voting equilibria (Condorcet …) also proved that the result holds under single-peakedness, for a wide class of voting rules that includes the majority rule … and preserves a version of the median voter result for a large class of voting rules. We also show that top monotonicity …

We offer complete characterizations of the equilibrium outcomes of two prominent agenda voting institutions that are … equivalently the Euro-Latin procedure. Our axiomatic approach provides a proper understanding of these voting institutions, and … allows comparisons between them, and with other voting procedures. …

We report on an experiment comparing compulsory and voluntary voting institutions in a voting game with common … preferences. Rational choice theory predicts sharp differences in voter behavior between these two institutions. If voting is … compulsory, then voters may find it rational to vote insincerely, i.e., against their private information. If voting is voluntary …