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Learning hypothesis testing, and Nash equilibrium

Foster, Dean P.; Young, H. Peyton - In: Games and economic behavior 45 (2003) 1, pp. 73-96

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001797567

Special issue on learning in games : a symposium in honor of David Blackwell

Foster, Dean P. (contributor); Levine, David K. (contributor) - 1999

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001443039

Regret in the on-line decision problem

Foster, Dean P.; Vohra, Rakesh - In: Games and economic behavior 29 (1999) 1/2, pp. 7-35

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001443053

A proof of calibration via Blackwell's approachability theorem

Foster, Dean P. - In: Games and economic behavior 29 (1999) 1/2, pp. 73-78

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001443059

On the nonconvergence of fictitious play in coordination games

Foster, Dean P. - In: Games and economic behavior 25 (1998) 1, pp. 79-96

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001250333

Cooperation in the short and in the long run

Young, H. Peyton - In: Games and economic behavior 3 (1991) 1, pp. 145-156

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001101125

Calibrated learning and correlated equilibrium

Foster, Dean P. - In: Games and economic behavior 21 (1997) 1, pp. 40-55

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001232548

Filtering and Forecasting with Misspecified Arch Models II : Making the Right Forecast with the Wrong Model

Nelson, Daniel B. - 1992

A companion paper (Nelson (1992)) showed that in data observed at high frequencies, an ARCH model may do a good job at estimating conditional variances, even when the ARCH model is severely misspecified. While such models may perform reasonably well at filtering (i.e., at estimating unobserved...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012474743

Smooth calibration, leaky forecasts, finite recall, and Nash dynamics

Foster, Dean P.; Hart, Sergiu - In: Games and economic behavior 109 (2018), pp. 271-293

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012173212