This paper develops a model of pricing to deter entry by a sole supplier of a network good. The authors show that the installed user base of a network good can serve a preemptive function similar to that of an investment in capacity if the entrant's good is incompatible with the incumbent's good...

Firms sometimes try to "poach" the current customers of their competitors by offering them special inducements to switch. The authors analyze duopoly poaching under both short-term and long-term contracts in two polar cases: either each consumer's brand preferences are constant from one period...

This paper explores a monopolist's incentives to provides upgraded versions of its software. In particular, the authors examine how market power, commitment problems and price discrimination may lead a monopolistice supplier of a network good to introduce upgrades when social welfare would be...

This paper proposes the solution concept of interim rationalizability, and shows that all type spaces that have the same hierarchies of beliefs have the same set of interim rationalizable outcomes. This solution concept characterizes common knowledge of rationality in the universal type space.

This paper discusses the implications of learning theory for the analysis of Bayesian games. One goal is to illuminate the issues that arise when modeling situations where players are learning about the distribution of Nature's move as well as learning about the opponents' strategies. A second...

better understand when mixed equilibria might arise within populations of interact acting agents, we examine a model of smoothed fictitious play that is designed to capture Harsanyi's "Purification", view of mixed equilibria in a setting with a large population of agents. Our analysis concerns...

We propose that a simple “dual-self” model gives a unified explanation for several empirical regularities, including the apparent time-inconsistency that has motivated models of hyperbolic discounting and Rabin’s paradox of risk aversion in the large and small. The model also implies that...

We argue that some but not all superstitions can persist when learning is rational and players are patient, and illustrate our argument with an example inspired by the code of Hammurabi. The code specified an “appeal by surviving in the river” as a way of deciding whether an accusation was...

This paper studies the monopoly pricing of overlapping generations of a durable good. We focus on two sorts of goods: those with an active second-hand market and anonymous consumers, such as textbooks, and gods such as software, where there is no second-hand market and consumers are...