A decision maker needs to schedule several activities that take uncertain time to complete and are only valuable together. Some activities are bound to be finished earlier than others, thus incurring waiting costs. We show how to schedule activities optimally, how to give independent agents...

This paper considers the problem of estimating the distribution of payoffs in a discrete dynamic game, focusing on models where the goal is to learn about the distribution of firms' entry and exit costs. The idea is to begin with non parametric first stage etimates of entry and continuation...

The presence of noise in compliance times may have a critical impact on the selection of new technological standards. A technically superior standard is not necessarily viable because an arbitrarily small amount of noise may render coordination on that standard impossible. The criterion for the...

This paper explores information disclosure in matching markets, e. g. the informativeness of transcripts given out by universities. We show that the same amount of information is disclosed in all equilibria. We then demonstrate that if universities disclose the equilibrium amount of information,...