The phenomenon of predating predators requires at least three specimens to whom we refer as players 1, 2, and 3. Player 1 has simply to guess nature when trying to find food. Player 2 is hunting player 1 in the hope that 1 is well fed but must also avoid being hunted by player 3. One major...

This paper raises the question of whether differential regularity in the repetition of a set of items would elicit a differential regularity in the repetition of a set of items would elicit a differential liking for those items. Two experiments are reported. In the first, 120 participants either...

In plausible theories of bounded rationality actors are not stimulus-response machines but human beings. As such they are guided by theories that predict the course of the world and prescribe how they should try to intervene in that course. Since boundedly rational human beings cannot only...

Taking seriously the philosophical foundations of classical strategic theories of choice-making we scrutinize to what extent planning on equilibrium strategies can be justified "eductively" among rational players and how this can be utilizes to analyze games by their "game-like" sub-structures,...

In plausible theories of bounded rationality actors are not stimulus-response machines but human beings. As such they are guided by theories that predict the course of the world and prescribe how they should try to intervene in that course. Since boundedly rational human beings cannot only...

In equal punishment games like in ultimatum games first a proposer suggests how to split the pie, i.e. a positive monetary reward. Unlike in ultimatum games, the responder can decide among many (for proposer and responder) equal penalty payments. To exclude negative payoffs, punishment was...

By vetoing one question mutually efficient agreements. On the other hand, the threat of vetoing may prevent exploitation. Based on a generalization of ultimatum bargaining (Suleiman, 1996), we first elicit the responders' certainty equivalents for three different degrees of veto power....

Die Frage, welche Dartsellungsweise strategischer Interaktionen man als grundlegend für die spieltheoretische Analyse und insoweit als normale Form von Spielen anzusehen hat, ist keineswegs rein sprachlicher Natur. Systematische Gründe sprechen dafür, die Agentennormalform anstelle der...

Many consumption prices are highly volatile. It would certainly overburden our cognitive system to fully adjust to all these changes. Households therefore often rely on simple heuristics when deciding what to consume, e.g. in the form of a constant budget share for a specific consumption...