Unemployment insurance agencies may combat moral hazard by punishing refusals to apply to assigned vacancies. However … sanctions on the unemployment duration and the quality of job matches, in conjunction with the possibility to report sick. We … relative attractiveness of vacancy referrals increases over the time spent in unemployment. Overall, around 9% of sickness …

Arbeitslosenversicherung vorgestellt. Zentrales Element ist hierbei die kombinierte Versicherung von Arbeitslosigkeit und Langlebigkeit in …

Based on a combined register database for Norwegian and Swedish unemployment spells, we use the ‘between …-countries-variation’ in the unemployment insurance systems to identify causal effects. The elasticity of the job hazard rate with respect to …

This study describes the probability of transition from unemployment with unemployment insurance (UI) to sickness with …

We investigate how unemployment exit probabilities are affected by economic incentives, spell duration and … macroeconomic conditions. Building on a database containing all registered unemployment spells in Norway in 1989-1998, we apply an …

Based on a sequence of reforms in the Norwegian unemployment insurance (UI) system, we show that activity-oriented UI … limitations on unconditional UI entitlements, and high sanction probabilities - deliver substantially shorter unemployment spells … introduction of a soft constraint appears particularly effec-tive; our results show that the expected unemployment duration falls …

effectiveness of such subsidized training programmes for means-tested unemployment benefit recipients in Germany. The empirical … beneficial impact on participants: It reduces the share of unemployment benefit II recipients and raises the employment rate in …