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Work motivation, institutions, and performance
Gächter, Simon; Falk, Armin - Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre, …
treatment we find that reciprocity is a powerful contract enforcement device. A second experiment establishes that repeated game …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005463514
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Motivation Crowding Theory: A Survey Of Empirical Evidence, Revised Version
Frey, Bruno S.; Jegen, Reto - Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre, …
The Motivation Crowding Effect suggests that external intervention via monetary incentives punishments may undermine, and under different identifiable conditions strengthen, intrinsic motivation. As of today, the theoretical possibility of motivation crowding has been the main subject of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005463521
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Living in Two Neighborhoods - Social Interactions in the Lab
Falk, Armin; Fischbacher, Urs; Gächter, Simon - Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre, …
social interaction effects. Testing for such effects raises severe identification problems. We conduct an experiment that … avoids these problems. The main design feature is that each subject simultaneously is a member of two randomly assigned and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005463522
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Wise crowds or wise minorities?
Brunner, Christoph; Goeree, Jacob K. - Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre, … - 2009
This paper reports results from social learning experiments where subjects choose between two options and each subject …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005015167
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An experimental study of auctions versus grandfathering to assign pollution permits
Goeree, Jacob K.; Holt, Charles A.; Palmer, Karen; … - Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre, … - 2009
-allocations. In the experiment, high emitters exercise market power in the spot market and permit holdings under grandfathering remain …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005015169
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Cooperativeness and Impatience in the Tragedy of the Commons
Fehr, Ernst; Leibbrandt, Andreas - Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre, … - 2008
fishermen who exhibit a higher propensity for cooperation in a laboratory public goods experiment, and those who show more … patience in a laboratory time preference experiment, exploit the fishing grounds less in their daily lives. Moreover, because …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005585622
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Fairness and Incentives in a Multi-Task Principal-Agent Model
Fehr, Ernst; Schmidt, Klaus M. - Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre, …
This paper reports on a two-task principal-agent experiment in which only one task is contractible. The principal can …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005585634
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Heterogeneous social preferences and the dynamics of free riding in public goods
Fischbacher, Urs; Gächter, Simon - Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre, … - 2005
preference in one experiment and make a point prediction about the contribution to a repeated public good. This allows for a … predicted contributions, because they contribute in the first half of the experiment. We also show that the interaction of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005585644
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Appropriating the Commons - A Theoretical Explanation
Falk, Armin; Fehr, Ernst; Fischbacher, Urs - Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre, …
pool resource (CPR) experiments. The evidence indicates that in standard CPR games without communication and without …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005585660
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Money and Reciprocity
Hens, Thorsten; Vogt, Bodo - Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre, …
Based on an experimental analysis of a simple monetary economy we argue that a monetary system is more stable than one would expect from individual rationality. We show that positive reciprocity stabilizes the monetary system, provided every participant considers the feedbacks of his choice to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005627772