We study a three-country model of international environmental agreements where countries may choose either to limit their emissions or to behave noncooperatively. First, we provide a taxonomy of various kinds of strategic situations. Then, by applying some recently developed game-theoretic...

Standard non-cooperative game theoretical models of international environmental agreements (IEAs) draw a pessimistic picture of the prospective of successful cooperation: only small coalitions are stable that achieve only little. However, there also exist IEAs with higher participation and more...

This paper analyses stability of coalitions for greenhouse gas abatement for different sharing rules applied to the gains from co-operation. We use a 12-regions model designed to examine internal and external stability of coalitions (STACO). We compare different sharing rules like, for example,...

This article determines the conditions under which the Southern countries should act together, or separately, while negotiating with the North about climate change policy and about the conditions for future Southern engagement. The paper models the international negotiations with complete and...

Technological development is likely to play an important role in curbing growth in greenhouse gas emissions. It is therefore important to incorporate factors influencing technological change in climate policy analyses. This paper studies climate policy when there are technology spillovers...

This paper compares stability of international environmental agreements for six different rules of coalition formation under very general conditions (any type of heterogeneity between countries). The rules can be interpreted as different institutional settings in which treaty formations take...

Many international treaties come into force only after a minimum number of countries have signed and ratified the treaty. Why do countries agree to introduce a minimum participation constraint among the rules characterising an international treaty? This question is particularly relevant in the...

In this paper we examine the formation of International Environmental Agreements (IEAs). We provide an analytical treatment of the main model used in the literature and offer a formal solution of it (which has not been available so far), while we clarify some misconceptions that exist in the...

Taking account of sinks credits as agreed in Bonn and Marrakech, this paper illustrates how market power could be exerted in the absence of the US ratification under Annex 1 trading and explores the potential implications of the non-competitive supply behavior for the international market of...