Showing 1 - 10 of 125
This paper explores the consequences and implications of the "dual role of promotion'' in an environment where a firm must simultaneously achieve two distinct goals -- assignment and incentive provision -- via the strategic use of promotions. We argue that the efficient promotion rule is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013106612
. When the seller lacks such commitment power, however, there instead exists an equilibrium in which the seller's expected …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010332208
It is often touted that decisiveness is one of the most important qualities to be possessed by leaders, broadly defined. To see how and why decisiveness can be a valuable asset in organizations, we construct a model of strategic information transmission where: (i) a decision maker solicits...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010332366
This paper explores the consequences and implications of the dual role of promotion in an environment where a firm must simultaneously achieve two distinct goals - assignment and incentive provision - via the strategic use of promotions. We argue that the efficient promotion rule is generally...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010332465
recursive equilibrium structure under no commitment which can be exploited to obtain a full characterization of equilibrium. The … analysis allows us to evaluate the exact value of commitment for any given set of parameters and provides insight into when it …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012013628
We analyze a cheap talk model in which an informed sender and an uninformed receiver engage in finite-period communication before the receiver chooses a project. During the communication phase, in each period, the sender sends a cheap talk message and the receiver voluntarily pays money for the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012901585
In this paper we analyze a cheap talk model with a partially informed receiver. In clear contrast to the previous literature, we find that there is a case where the receiver's prior knowledge enhances the amount of information conveyed via cheap talk. The point of departure is our explicit focus...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014171000
. When the seller lacks such commitment power, however, there instead exists an equilibrium in which the seller's expected …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014158213
This study analyzes one-leader and multiple-follower Stackelberg games with demand uncertainty. We demonstrate that the weight on public information regarding a follower's estimation of demand uncertainty determines the strategic relationship between the leader and each follower. When the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014143911
This paper considers a model of strategic information transmission with an imperfectly informed receiver and provides a simple logic by which the receiver's prior knowledge becomes an impediment to efficient communication. We show that the extent of communication is severely limited as the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014206893