In this paper, we extend the individual evolutionary learning model by incorporating other-regarding considerations and apply the model to some Cournot games. Using the model fitted to the experimental data of a repeated 3-player Cournot game (with nonlinear cost and demand functions), we...

This paper examines a mechanism of liquidity-preference fluctuations caused by changes in people's belief about a random liquidity shock. When observing the shock, they rationally update their belief so that the shock probability is higher; consequently they raise liquidity preference and reduce...

We conducted a field experiment on the Internet and investigated the participants' belief updating in an individual learning environment where they observe a sequence of private signals and in a social learning environment where they observe a sequence of other people's actions. We observed that...

We extend the model of Cornand and Heinemann (2008, Economic Journal) and examine how to implement partial announcement by selling public information when the agents' action is strategic complements. In a game of information acquisition, there exist multiple equilibria and the partial...

We examine a foreign firm's choice between exporting and foreign direct investment (FDI) under country-specific cost uncertainty. Unlike exporting, FDI exposes foreign and home firms to common shocks. This results in a correlation of strategies, harming the firms. However, the exposure to common...

We examine the role of cost uncertainty in a firm's choice between exporting and foreign investment in oligopolistic industry. We consider both foreign direct investment and an international joint venture, and allow country-specific and firm-specific cost uncertainty. Unlike exporting, either...

When a durable good of uncertain quality is introduced to the market, some consumers strategically delay their buying to the next period with the hope of learning the unknown quality. We analyze the monopolist's pricing and waiting strategies when consumers have strategic delay incentives. We...

We study disclosure of information about the multidimensional state of the world when uninformed receivers' actions affect the sender's utility. Given a disclosure rule, the receivers form an expectation about the state following each message. Under the assumption that the sender's expected...