In this paper, we investigate how changes in the skill mix of local labor supply are absorbedby the economy. We distinguish between three adjustment mechanisms: through factorprices, through an expansion in the size of those production units that use the moreabundant skill group more...

We investigate a team setting in which workers have different degrees of commitment to theoutcome of their work. We show that if there are complementarities in production and if theteam manager has some information about team members, interventions that the managerundertakes in order to assure...

Teamwork and cooperation between workers can be of substantial value to a firm, yet thelevel of worker cooperation often varies between individual firms. We show that thesedifferences can be the result of labor market competition if workers have heterogeneouspreferences and preferences are...

To investigate the size and the timing of the direct impact of participatory arrangements onbusiness performance, we assemble and analyze extraordinary daily data – for rejection,production and downtime rates for all operators in a single plant during a 35 month period,more than 77,000...

Using data on team assignment and weekly output for all weavers in an urban Chinese textilefirm between April 2003 and March 2004, this paper studies a) how randomly assignedteammates affect an individual worker’s behavior under a tournament-style incentive scheme,and b) how such effects...

This paper explores theoretically and empirically potentially important yet often-neglectedlinkage between task coordination within the organization and the structure of organizationand bundling of HRMPs (Human Resource Management Practices). In so doing, we alsoprovide fresh insights on the...

Paper addresses the recent initiatives of EU Lisbon Agenda to increase level of R&Dexpenses in EU Member States by studying firm-level panel data in most advanced transitioneconomy, Slovenia. Previous empirical literature – mainly cross-sectional – has tested thedemand-pull hypothesis and...

A large, mature and robust economic literature on pay for performance now exists, whichprovides a useful framework for thinking about pay for performance systems. I use thelessons of the literature to discuss how to design and implement pay for performance inpractice....

In this paper we show that subtle forms of deceit undermine the effectiveness of incentives.We design an experiment in which the principal has an interest in underreporting the trueperformance difference between the agents in a dynamic tournament...

On theoretical grounds, monitoring of top executives by the (supervisory) board is expectedto be value relevant. The empirical evidence is ambiguous and we analyze three noncompetingexplanations for this ambiguity: (i) The positive effect on firm value of boardmonitoring is hidden in stock price...