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each other. Thus, our framework provides some first insights into the costs and benefits of interventions in teams. It …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013316729
In recent decades, many firms offered more discretion to their employees, often increasing the productivity of effort but also leaving more opportunities for shirking. These "high-performance work systems" are difficult to understand in terms of standard moral hazard models. We show...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013148345
When designing incentives for a manager, the trade-off between insurance and a "good" allocation of effort across various tasks is often identified with a trade-off between the responsiveness (sensitivity, precision, signal-noise ratio) of the performance measure and its similarity (congruity,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013317592
costs and inequality aversion …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013324841
We analyze a long-term contracting problem involving common uncertainty about a parameter capturing the productivity of the relationship, and featuring a hidden action for the agent. We develop an approach that works for any utility function when the parameter and noise are normally distributed...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013135822
We develop a new approach to quantify how patients respond to dynamic incentives in health insurance contracts with a deductible. Our approach exploits two sources of variation in a differences-in-regression-discontinuities design: deductible contracts reset at the beginning of the year, and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012837905
In this paper, we examine the impact of pay-for-performance incentives on learning-by-doing. We exploit personnel data on fruit pickers paid under two distinct compensation contracts: a standard piece rate plan and a piece rate plan with an extra one-time bonus tied to output. Under the bonus...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012870161
This paper studies the design of optimal contracts in dynamic environments where agents learn by doing. We derive a condition under which contracts are fully incentive compatible. A closed-form solution is obtained when agents have CARA utility. It shows that human capital accumulation...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013058309
seminal study, Lazear (1990) found that contract avoidance of severance pay firing costs was theoretically simple – a bonding …, formal measures of severance-induced firing costs and hiring costs are derived. Firing costs are, it turns out …, systematically less than benefit generosity alone would imply. Moreover their interrelationship with hiring costs, often employed in …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013121754
Severance pay mandates are an appealing job displacement insurance strategy in developing countries, which have only modest government administrative capacities, but they carry the threat of adverse indirect effects. A critical review of the empirical literature reveals that severance benefit...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013123590