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Whistle-Blower Protection : Theory and Experimental Evidence
Mechtenberg, Lydia - 2017
issues in a theory-guided lab experiment. Easily attainable ("belief-based") protection indeed leads to more reports, both …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012960283
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When Criminality Begets Crime : The Role of Elected Politicians in India
Prakash, Nishith; Sahoo, Soham; Saraswat, Deepak; … - 2022
This paper estimates the causal impact of electing criminally accused politicians and their nature of criminality on crime in India. We exploit the quasi-random variation in the outcome of close elections between candidates with and without criminal accusations to instrument the share of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014083716
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Bureaucratic Rents and Life Satisfaction
Luechinger, Simon; Meier, Stephan; Stutzer, Alois - 2021
The monopoly position of the public bureaucracy in providing public services allows government employees to acquire rents. Those rents can involve higher wages, monetary and non-monetary fringe benefits (e.g., pensions and staffing), and/or bribes. We propose a direct measure to capture the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013317746
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Bribery, Hold-Up and Bureaucratic Structure
Bennett, John - 2018
We analyze the provision of infrastructure by a foreign investor when the domestic bureaucracy is corrupt, but puts some weight on domestic welfare. The investor may pay a bribe in return for a higher provisional contract price. After the investment has been sunk, the bureaucracy may hold up the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012915722
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Corruption and Bureaucratic Structure in a Developing Economy
Bennett, John - 2007
We address the impact of corruption in a developing economy in the context of an empirically relevant hold-up problem - when a foreign firm sinks an investment to provide infrastructure services. We focus on the structure of the economy's bureaucracy, which can be centralized or decentralized,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012778446
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The Tragedy of Corruption
Chen, Yefeng - 2016
We investigate corruption as a social dilemma by means of a bribery game in which a risk of collective sanction of the public officials is introduced when the number of officials accepting a bribe from firms reaches a certain threshold. We show that, despite the social risk, the pursuit of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012983900
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The Political Resource Curse
Brollo, Fernanda - 2010
politicians, both with theory and data. The theory is based on a version of the career concerns model of political agency with … implications of the theory and identify the causal effect of larger federal transfers on political corruption and the observed … features of political candidates at the municipal level. In accordance with the predictions of the theory, we find that larger …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013148349
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Inequality, Institutions and Cooperation
Markussen, Thomas; Sharma, Smriti; Singhal, Saurabh; … - 2021
We examine the effects of randomly introduced economic inequality on voluntary co- operation and whether this relationship is influenced by the quality of local institutions, as proxied by corruption. We use representative data from a large-scale lab-in-the-field public goods experiment with...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013315085
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Redistributive Politics and Market Efficiency : An Experimental Study
Großer, Jens - 2011
We study the interaction between competitive markets that produce large but unequally distributed welfare gains and elections through which the poor majority can redistribute income away from the rich minority. In our simple laboratory democracy, subjects first earn their income by trading in a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013134222
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Delinquent Networks
Ballester, Coralio - 2009
Delinquents are embedded in a network of relationships. Social ties among delinquents are modeled by means of a graph where delinquents compete for a booty and benefit from local interactions with their neighbors. Each delinquent decides in a non-cooperative way how much delinquency effort he...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012763925