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The Response to Dynamic Incentives in Insurance Contracts with a Deductible : Evidence from a Differences-in-Regression-Discontinuities Design
Klein, Tobias J. - 2020
We develop a new approach to quantify how patients respond to dynamic incentives in health insurance contracts with a deductible. Our approach exploits two sources of variation in a differences-in-regression-discontinuities design: deductible contracts reset at the beginning of the year, and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012837905
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Double-Sided Moral Hazard in Job Displacement Insurance Contracts
Parsons, Donald O. - 2014
Job displacement insurance typically includes both unemployment benefits and lump-sum severance pay, and each has provoked policy concerns. Unemployment insurance concerns have centered on distorted job search/offer acceptance decisions by the worker, severance-induced firing cost concerns on...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013067317
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Hidden Insurance in a Moral Hazard Economy
Bertola, Giuseppe - 2013
We consider an economy where individuals privately choose effort and trade competitively priced securities that pay off with effort-determined probability. We show that if insurance against a negative shock is sufficiently incomplete, then standard functional form restrictions ensure that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013071425
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Optimal Incentive Contracts Under Moral Hazard When the Agent is Free to Leave
Englmaier, Florian - 2010
We characterize optimal incentive contracts in a moral hazard framework extended in two directions. First, after effort provision, the agent is free to leave and pursue some ex-post outside option. Second, the value of this outside option is increasing in effort, and hence endogenous. Optimal...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013141421
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Wage-Hours Contracts, Overtime Working and Premium Pay
Hart, Robert A.; Ma, Yui - 2021
This paper offers a contract-based theory to explain the determination of standard hours, overtime hours and overtime … premium pay. We expand on the wage contract literature that emphasises the role of firm-specific human capital and that … explores problems of contract efficiency in the face of information asymmetries between the firm and the worker. We first …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013324874
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Second-Degree Moral Hazard in a Real-World Credence Goods Market
Balafoutas, Loukas - 2014
Empirical literature on moral hazard focuses exclusively on the direct impact of asymmetric information on market outcomes, thus ignoring possible repercussions. We present a field experiment in which we consider a phenomenon that we call second-degree moral hazard – the tendency of the supply...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013061956
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Hiring Through Referrals in a Labor Market with Adverse Selection
Dariel, Aurelie - 2019
Information asymmetries can prevent markets from operating efficiently. An important example is the labor market, where employers face uncertainty about the productivity of job candidates. We examine theoretically and with laboratory experiments three key questions related to hiring via...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012870195
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Contracts as Reference Points : Experimental Evidence
Fehr, Ernst - 2009
reveal a new behavioral force: ex ante competition legitimizes the terms of a contract, and aggrievement and shading occur … mainly about outcomes within the contract …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012765614
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Referral Incentives in Crowdfunding
Naroditskiy, Victor - 2015
Word-of-mouth, referral, or viral marketing is a highly sought-after way of advertising. We undertake a field experiment that compares incentive mechanisms for encouraging social media shares to support a given cause. Our experiment takes place on a website set up to promote a fundraising drive...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013034083
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Bonus Culture : Competitive Pay, Screening, and Multitasking
Bénabou, Roland - 2013
This paper analyzes the impact of labor market competition and skill-biased technical change on the structure of compensation. The model combines multitasking and screening, embedded into a Hotelling-like framework. Competition for the most talented workers leads to an escalating reliance on...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013083378