Retention contracts with asymmetric information : optimistic approach vs pessimistic approach
Year of publication: |
2023
|
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Authors: | Athamena, Belkacem ; Houhamdi, Zina ; El Refae, Ghaleb A. |
Published in: |
Journal of financial reporting & accounting : JFRA. - Bingley : Emerald, ISSN 2042-5856, ZDB-ID 2490369-3. - Vol. 21.2023, 1, p. 156-177
|
Subject: | Information asymmetry | Moral hazard | Principal-agent problem | Retention contracts | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Moral Hazard | Vertragstheorie | Contract theory | Vertrag | Contract | Adverse Selektion | Adverse selection | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive |
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