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optima, non-linear income taxation is a key complement to unemployment insurance. According to the level of the workers …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010276945
What is the motivational effect of imposing a minimum effort requirement? Agents may no longer exert voluntary effort but merely meet the requirement. Here, we examine how such hidden costs of control change when control is considered legitimate. We study a principal-agent model where control...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010268243
The issue of whether unemployment benefits should increase or decrease over the unemployment spell is analyzed in a … productivity of unemployed is constant over the unemployment spell, benefits should typically increase or be constant. The only …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010262469
We consider a firm which pays a worker for his effort over several periods. The more the firm pays in one period, the wealthier the worker is in the following periods, and so the more he must be paid for a given effort. This wealth effect can induce an employer to pay little initially and more...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010261892
This paper analyzes the impact of labor market competition and skill-biased technical change on the structure of compensation. The model combines multitasking and screening, embedded into a Hotelling-like framework. Competition for the most talented workers leads to an escalating reliance on...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010293214
This paper analyzes the impact of labor market competition and skill-biased technical change on the structure of compensation. The model combines multitasking and screening, embedded into a Hotelling-like framework. Competition for the most talented workers leads to an escalating reliance on...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010635587
We derive the shape of optimal unemployment insurance (UI) contracts when agents can exert search effort but face …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010262113
We examine a situation where efforts on different tasks positively affect production but are not separately verifiable and where the manager (principal) and the worker (agent) have different ideas about how production should be carried out: agents prefer a less efficient way of production. We...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010267331
Consider a principal-agent relationship in which more effort by the agent raises the likelihood of success. Does rewarding success, i.e., paying a bonus, increase effort in this case? I find that bonuses have not only an incentive but also an income effect. Overall, bonuses paid for success may...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010268396
We examine the second-best family policy under the assumption that both the number and the future earning capacities of the children born to a couple are random variables with probability distributions conditional on unobservable parental actions. Potential parents take their decisions without...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010269114