High Compensation Creates a Ratchet Effect
Year of publication: |
2004
|
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Authors: | Glazer, Amihai ; Gersbach, Hans |
Publisher: |
Bonn : Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) |
Subject: | Vergütungssystem | Anreizvertrag | Leistungsmotivation | Vermögenseffekt | Arbeitsmobilität | Agency Theory | Theorie | principal-agent | compensation | moral hazard | wealth effects | Ratchet effects | high-powered incentives |
Series: | IZA Discussion Papers ; 1143 |
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Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Type of publication (narrower categories): | Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Other identifiers: | 386980365 [GVK] hdl:10419/20380 [Handle] |
Classification: | J60 - Mobility, Unemployment, and Vacancies. General ; J30 - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs. General ; D80 - Information and Uncertainty. General |
Source: |
-
High Compensation Creates a Ratchet Effect
Gersbach, Hans, (2004)
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Luck, Effort and Reward in an Organisational Hierarchy
Audas, Rick, (2000)
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Hortala-Vallve, Rafael, (2008)
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High compensation creates a ratchet effect
Gersbach, Hans, (2009)
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High compensation creates a ratchet effect
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Gersbach, Hans, (1999)
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