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Worker directors: a German product that didn't export?

Addison, John T.; Schnabel, Claus - 2009

Despite its lack of attractiveness to other countries, the German system of quasi-parity codetermination at company level has held up remarkably well. We recount the theoretical arguments for and against codetermination and survey the empirical evidence on the effects of the institution, tracing...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010269284

CEO and board characteristics as determinants of private benefits of control: Evidence from the Russian stock exchange

Berezinets, Irina; Ilina, Yulia; Muravyev, Alexander - 2011

This paper investigates whether and how various characteristics of CEOs and corporate boards are related to the severity of corporate governance problems within firms. The latter is proxied by private benefits of control, which we measure for dual class stock firms using the voting premium...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010282260

What explains the rise in CEO pay in Germany? A panel data analysis for 1977 - 2009

Fabbri, Francesca; Marin, Dalia - 2012

The compensation of executive board members in Germany has become a highly controversial topic since Vodafone's hostile … unique panel data evidence of the 500 largest firms in Germany in the period 1977-2009 we test two prominent hypotheses in … manager power hypothesis for Germany as executives tend to be rewarded when the sector is doing well rather than the firm they …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010282632

Retained State Shareholding in Chinese PLCs : Does Government Ownership Reduce Corporate Value?

Tian, Lihui; Estrin, Saul - 2005

The role of government shareholding in corporate performance is central to an understanding of China?s newly privatized large firms. In this paper, we analyze shareholders as agents that can both harm and benefit companies. We examine the ownership structure of 826 listed corporations and find...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010262209

Executive compensation, firm performance, and chaebols in Korea: evidence from new panel data

Kato, Takao; Kim, Woochan; Lee, Ju Ho - 2005

This paper provides the first rigorous econometric estimates on the pay-performance relations for executives of Korean firms with and without Chaebol affiliation. To do so, we have assembled for the first time panel data (that provide information not only on executive compensation and firm...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010267324

Social networks in the boardroom

Kramarz, Francis; Thesmar, David - 2006

This paper provides empirical evidence consistent with the facts that (1) social networks may strongly affect board composition and (2) social networks may be detrimental to corporate governance. Our empirical investigation relies on a unique dataset on executives and outside directors of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010267612

Firm performance and managerial turnover: the case of Ukraine

Muravyev, Alexander; Talavera, Oleksandr; Bilyk, Olga; … - 2009

The paper studies whether and how CEO turnover in Ukrainian firms is related to their performance. Based on a novel dataset covering Ukrainian joint stock companies in 2002-2006, the paper finds statistically significant negative association between the past performance of firms measured by...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010271280

Ownership or Performance: What Determines Board of Directors' Turnover in Italy?

Brunello, Giorgio; Graziano, Clara; Parigi, Bruno Maria - 2000

This paper studies the turnover of board of directors members in a sample of 72 companies listed on the Milan Stock Exchange during the period 1988-1996. We investigate whether board members change more frequently when company performance is poor, as the literature suggests, and whether and how...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010276137

The value relevance of top executive departures: evidence from the Netherlands

Cools, Kees; van Praag, C. Mirjam - 2007

On theoretical grounds, monitoring of top executives by the (supervisory) board is expected to be value relevant. The empirical evidence is ambiguous and we analyze three non-competing explanations for this ambiguity: (i) The positive effect on firm value of board monitoring is hidden in stock...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010276315

Rhineland exit?

Bovenberg, Ary Lans; Teulings, Coen N. - 2008

We argue in favour of the shareholder model of the firm for three main reasons. First, serving multiple stakeholders leads to ill-defined property rights. What sounds like a fair compromise between stakeholders can easily evolve in a permanent struggle between the stakeholders about the ultimate...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010276859

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