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Excess leverage and productivity growth in emerging economies: Is there a threshold effect?
Coricelli, Fabrizio; Driffield, Nigel; Pal, Sarmistha; … - 2010
The paper examines the relationship between leverage and growth in a group of emerging central and eastern European countries, who are at different levels of financial market development. We hypothesize a non-linear relationship in that moderate leverage could boost growth while very high...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010269864
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How Often Should You Open the Door? Optimal Monitoring to Screen Heterogeneous Agents
Ichino, Andrea; Muehlheusser, Gerd - 2004
This paper shows that monitoring too much a partner in the initial phase of a relationship may not be optimal if the … is simple: by monitoring too much we learn less on how the partner will behave when he is not monitored. Only by giving …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010261760
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The interdependence of R&D activity and debt financing of young firms
Fryges, Helmut; Kohn, Karsten; Ullrich, Katrin - 2011
We investigate the interdependence of debt financing and R&D activities of young firms. Using micro-level data of the KfW/ZEW Start-up Panel, our estimation results show that firm characteristics are more important than personal characteristics of the founders for explaining young firms'...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010286852
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Does Monitoring Decrease Work Effort? : The Complementarity Between Agency and Crowding-Out Theories
Dickinson, David; Villeval, Marie-Claire - 2004
Agency theory assumes that tighter monitoring by the principal should motivate the agent to raise his effort level … realtask laboratory experiment, our results show that principals are not trustful enough to refrain from monitoring the agents …, and most of the agents react to the disciplining effect of monitoring. However we find also some evidence that intrinsic …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010261972
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Early interventions and disability insurance: Experience from a field experiment
Engström, Per; Hägglund, Pathric; Johansson, Per - 2012
This paper estimates the effects of early interventions in the Swedish sickness insurance system. The aim of the interventions is to screen and, further to, rehabilitate sick listed individuals. We find that the early interventions - in contrast to what is expected - increase the inflow into...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010282634
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How Often Should You Open the Door? Optimal Monitoring to Screen Heterogeneous Agents
Ichino, Andrea; Muehlheusser, Gerd - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2004
This paper shows that monitoring too much a partner in the initial phase of a relationship may not be optimal if the … is simple: by monitoring too much we learn less on how the partner will behave when he is not monitored. Only by giving …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005703754
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Does bargaining matter in the small firm matching model?
L'Haridon, Olivier; Malherbet, Franck; Pérez-Duarte, … - 2010
In this article, we use a stylized model of the labor market to investigate the effects of three alternative and well-known bargaining solutions. We apply the Nash, the Egalitarian and the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solutions in the small firm's matching model of unemployment. To the best of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010274621
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An Economic Model of Child Custody
Francesconi, Marco; Muthoo, Abhinay - 2003
This paper develops a model of child custody based on an incomplete-contract approach to the allocation of property rights. Because of the presence of transaction costs in marriage, altruistic parents cannot contract upon the investments they make into their children, but can reduce the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010261582
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Stakeholders, Bargaining and Strikes
Shields, Michael A.; Price, Stephen Wheatley - 2001
We study bilateral bargaining problems with interested third parties, the stakeholders that enjoy benefits upon a bilateral agreement. We explore the strategic implications of this third party involvement. Our main finding is that the potential willingness of the stakeholder to make...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010262598
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The Hold-Down Problem and the Boundaries of the Firm: Lessons from a Hidden Action Model with Endogenous Outside Option
Schnedler, Wendelin; Sunde, Uwe - 2002
This paper offers a rationale for limiting the delegation of (real) authority, which neither relies on insurance arguments nor depends on ownership structure. We analyse a repeated hidden action model in which the actions of a risk neutral agent determine his future outside option. Consequently,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010262786