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On the Prudence of Rewarding A While Hoping for B
Schnedler, Wendelin - 2003
In multiple-task hidden-action models, the (mis-)allocation of effort may play an important role for benefit creation. Signals which capture this benefit and which are used in incentive schemes should thus not only be judged by the noise and the associated costs but also by the mis-allocation...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010262723
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Task difficulty, performance measure characteristics, and the trade-off between insurance and well-allocated effort
Schnedler, Wendelin - 2006
When designing incentives for a manager, the trade-off between insurance and a good allocation of effort across various tasks is often identified with a trade-off between the responsiveness (sensitivity, precision, signal-noise ratio) of the performance measure and its similarity (congruity,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010268002
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Hidden action, identification, and organization design
Schnedler, Wendelin - 2010
Incentives often fail in inducing economic agents to engage in a desirable activity; implementability is restricted. What restricts implementability? When does re-organization help to overcome this restriction? This paper shows that any restriction of implementability is caused by an...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010278365
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Mystery Shopping as a Strategic Management Practice in Multi-Site Firms
Block, Sidney T.; Friebel, Guido; Heinz, Matthias; … - 2022
Anonymous and unannounced site inspections known as "Mystery Shopping" (MS) are common in multi-site service firms, but little is known about the strategic importance of this practice. We conceptualize MS as a monitoring tool firms use to implement the optimal allocation of site resources...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013426448
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Hidden Action, Identification, and Organization Design
Schnedler, Wendelin - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2010
Incentives often fail in inducing economic agents to engage in a desirable activity; implementability is restricted. What restricts implementability? When does re-organization help to overcome this restriction? This paper shows that any restriction of implementability is caused by an...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008727777
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On the Prudence of Rewarding A While Hoping for B
Schnedler, Wendelin - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2003
In multiple-task hidden-action models, the (mis-)allocation of effort may play an important role for benefit creation. Signals which capture this benefit and which are used in incentive schemes should thus not only be judged by the noise and the associated costs but also by the mis-allocation...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005761834
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Task Difficulty, Performance Measure Characteristics, and the Trade-Off between Insurance and Well-Allocated Effort
Schnedler, Wendelin - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2006
When designing incentives for a manager, the trade-off between insurance and a “good” allocation of effort across various tasks is often identified with a trade-off between the responsiveness (sensitivity, precision, signal-noise ratio) of the performance measure and its similarity...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005566602
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An Experimental Study of the POUM Hypothesis
Checchi, Daniele; Filippin, Antonio - 2003
period and individuals are not too risk averse. This paper tests the POUM hypothesis by means of a within subjects experiment … inequality aversion are (partially) controlled for via either the experiment design or the information collected during the … experiment. We find that the POUM hypothesis holds under alternative specifications, even when we control for individual fixed …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010261622
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Other-Regarding Preferences and Performance Pay : An Experiment on Incentives and Sorting
Villeval, Marie-Claire; Eriksson, Tor - 2004
experiment that analyzes the influence of other-regarding preferences on sorting and incentives. Experimental evidence shows that …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010261940
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A Nation-Wide Laboratory: Examining Trust and Trustworthiness by Integrating Behavioral Experiments into Representative Surveys
Fehr, Ernst; Fischbacher, Urs; von Rosenbladt, Bernhard; … - 2003
representative behavioral data from a social dilemma experiment. We identify which survey questions intended to elicit people's trust … correlate well with behaviorally exhibited trust in the experiment. People above the age of 65, highly skilled workers and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010262013