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Severance pay mandates: Firing costs, hiring costs, and firm avoidance behaviors

Parsons, Donald O. - 2011

The potentially adverse labor market effects of severance pay mandates are a continuing source of policy concern. In a seminal study, Lazear (1990) found that contract avoidance of severance pay firing costs was theoretically simple - a bonding scheme would do - but that empirically the labor...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010278733

Does Medicaid Coverage for Pregnant Women Affect Prenatal Health Behaviors?

Dave, Dhaval M.; Kaestner, Robert; Wehby, George - 2016

Despite plausible mechanisms, little research has evaluated potential changes in health behaviors as a result of the Medicaid expansions of the 1980s and 1990s. In this paper, we provide the first national study of the effects of Medicaid on health behaviors for pregnant women, which is a group...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011479230

Severance Pay Mandates: Firing Costs, Hiring Costs, and Firm Avoidance Behaviors

Parsons, Donald O. - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2011

The potentially adverse labor market effects of severance pay mandates are a continuing source of policy concern. In a seminal study, Lazear (1990) found that contract avoidance of severance pay firing costs was theoretically simple – a bonding scheme would do – but that empirically the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009225769

The Cost of Health Insurance and Entry into Entrepreneurship

Fossen, Frank M.; Hossain, Mobarak; Mukhopadhyay, Sankar; … - 2021

Unavailable or expensive health insurance may hinder the transition of individuals from paid employment to … entrepreneurship. The literature argues that the guaranteed availability of health insurance introduced by the Affordable Care Act (ACA … investigate how much the cost of health insurance when leaving paid employment—given availability of health insurance—matters for …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012882467

An Adverse Selection Model of Optimal Unemployment Insurance

Hagedorn, Marcus; Kaul, Ashok; Mennel, Tim - 2003

We derive the shape of optimal unemployment insurance (UI) contracts when agents can exert search effort but face …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010262113

Should UI Benefits Really Fall Over Time?

Hassler, John; Rodríguez Mora, José V. - 2002

The issue of whether unemployment benefits should increase or decrease over the unemployment spell is analyzed in a tractable model allowing moral hazard, adverse selection and hidden saving. Analytical results show that when the search productivity of unemployed is constant over the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010262469

Health Care Reform and the Number of Doctor Visits - An Econometric Analysis

Winkelmann, Rainer - 2001

The paper evaluates the German health care reform of 1997, using the individual number of doctor visits as outcome measure. A new econometric model, the Probit-Poisson-log-normal model with correlated errors, describes the data better than existing count data models. Moreover, it has an...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010262522

Division of labour and directed production

Ratto, Marisa; Schnedler, Wendelin - 2005

We examine a situation where efforts on different tasks positively affect production but are not separately verifiable and where the manager (principal) and the worker (agent) have different ideas about how production should be carried out: agents prefer a less efficient way of production. We...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010267331

Legitimacy of control

Schnedler, Wendelin; Vadovic, Radovan - 2007

What is the motivational effect of imposing a minimum effort requirement? Agents may no longer exert voluntary effort but merely meet the requirement. Here, we examine how such hidden costs of control change when control is considered legitimate. We study a principal-agent model where control...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010268243

You don't always get what you pay for

Schnedler, Wendelin - 2007

Consider a principal-agent relationship in which more effort by the agent raises the likelihood of success. Does rewarding success, i.e., paying a bonus, increase effort in this case? I find that bonuses have not only an incentive but also an income effect. Overall, bonuses paid for success may...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010268396

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