We study finite zero-sum stochastic games in which players do not observe the actions of their opponent. Rather, at each stage, each player observes a stochastic signal that may depend on the current state and on the pair of actions chosen by the players. We assume that each player observes the...

We construct a non-zero sum game on the square, with separately continuous payoff functions, and which has no correlated equilibrium. This answers a recent question of Nowak.

We consider the "and" communication device that receives inputs from two players and outputs the public signal yes if both messages are yes, and outputs no otherwise. We prove that no correlation can securely be implemented using this device, even when infinitely many stages of communication are...

We offer a new representation for the space of conditional systems on a finite set. We prove its equivalence with the usual representations, and use it to give short proofs of several known results.

An absorbing game is a repeated game where some action combinations are absorbing, in the sense that whenever they are played, there is a positive probability that the game terminates, and the players receive some terminal payoff at every future stage. We prove that every multi-player absorbing...

A general communication device is a device that at every stage of the game receives a private message from each player, and in return sends a private signal to each player; the signals the device sends depend on past play, past signals it sent, and past messages it received. <p> An autonomous...</p>

Every finite extensive-form game with perfect information has a subgame-perfect equilibrium. In this note we settle to the negative an open problem regarding the existence of a subgame-perfect <InlineEquation ID="IEq4"> <EquationSource Format="TEX">$$\varepsilon $$</EquationSource> <EquationSource Format="MATHML"> <math xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink"> <mi mathvariant="italic">ε</mi> </math> </EquationSource> </InlineEquation>-equilibrium in perfect information games with infinite horizon and Borel...</equationsource></equationsource></inlineequation>