Delayed perfect monitoring in an infinitely repeated discounted game is studied. A player perfectly observes any other player’s action choice with a fixed and finite delay. The observational delays between different pairs of players are heterogeneous and asymmetric. The Folk theorem extends to...

Two agents independently choose mixed m-recall strategies that take actions in finite action spaces A <Subscript>1</Subscript> and A <Subscript>2</Subscript>. The strategies induce a random play, a <Subscript>1</Subscript>, a <Subscript>2</Subscript>, . . ., where a <Subscript> t </Subscript> assumes values in A <Subscript>1</Subscript> × A <Subscript>2</Subscript>. An M-recall observer observes the play. The goal of the agents is to make the observer...</subscript></subscript></subscript></subscript></subscript></subscript></subscript>

We consider repeated games with complete information and imperfect monitoring, where each player is assigned a fixed subset of players and only observes the moves chosen by the players in this subset. This structure is naturally represented by a directed graph. We prove that a generalized folk...

We study the effect of asynchronous choice structure on the possibility of cooperation in repeated strategic situations. We model the strategic situations as asynchronously repeated games, and define two notions of effective minimax value. We show that the order of players’ moves generally...

The set of payoffs associated to pure uniform equilibria of a repeated game with public observation is characterized in terms of the one shot-game. The key of the result is first, a study of the effect of undetectable deviations and second, the definition of new types of punishments using...