Two players may enter the game with a prior proxy or association agreement in order to strengthen their positions. There exist weighted majority voting games where a proxy agreement weakens the two players' collective power: the sum of their Shapley values with the agreement is less than without...

Van Damme and Weibull (1998, 2002) model the noise in games as endogenously determined tremble probabilities, by assuming that with some effort players can control the probability of implementing the intended strategy. Following their methodology, we derive logit-like adjustment rules for games...

Cooperative games in characteristic function form (TU games) are considered. We allow for variable populations or carriers. Weighted nucleoli are defined via weighted excesses for coalitions. A solution satisfies the Null Player Out (NPO) property, if elimination of a null player does not affect...

The selectope of a cooperative transferable utility game is the convex hull of the payoff vectors obtained by assigning the Harsanyi dividends of the coalitions to members determined by so-called selectors. The selectope is studied from a set-theoretic point of view, as superset of the core and...