We consider two dynamic games of foreign aid. <link rid="ss3">Model 1</link> deals with the case where donor countries continually feel the warm glow from the act of giving. <link rid="ss32">Model 2</link> postulates that donors will stop giving aid when a target level of development is reached. In <link rid="ss3">Model 1</link>, there are multiple equilibria that...

This paper examines how two geographically separated ports compete for a market consisting of manufacturing firms located between them. There is a service firm in each port, and these two firms, taking the infrastructure provided by their governments as given, compete in prices. The governments...

We develop a new framework for the analysis of the impact of trade liberalization on the wage structure and on welfare. Our model focuses on the decision of workers to accumulate firm-specific skills, by "on-the-job" training, knowing that this means their future wages will have to be...