In a public goods experiment, subjects can vary over a period of stochastic length two contribution levels: one is publicly observable (their cheap talk stated intention), while the other is not seen by the others (their secret intention). When the period suddenly stops, participants are...

This study analyzes the impact of entrepreneurship education at universities on the intentions of students to become entrepreneurs or self-employed in the short-term (immediately after graduation) and in the long-term (five years after graduation). A difference-in-differences approach is applied...

Both the European Community, its member countries and the United States have stimulated schools to implement entrepreneurship programs into schooling curricula on a large scale, based on the idea that entrepreneurial competencies and mindsets must be developed at school. The leading and...

Both the European Community, its member countries and the United States have stimulated schools to implement entrepreneurship programs into schooling curricula on a large scale, based on the idea that entrepreneurial competencies and mindsets must be developed at school. The leading and...

This study analyzes the impact of entrepreneurship education at universities on the intentions of students to become entrepreneurs or self-employed in the short-term (immediately after graduation) and in the long-term (five years after graduation). A difference-in-differences approach is applied...

Both the European Community, its member countries and the United States have stimulated schools to implement entrepreneurship programs into schooling curricula on a large scale, based on the idea that entrepreneurial competencies and mindsets must be developed at school. The leading and...

We experimentally analyze the effects of external interventions such as subsidy and targeting on investment decisions during the intervention and after. We employ a multi-period version of the trust (investment) game (Berg et al., 1995) introducing either the monetary incentives for contribution...

We analyze reciprocal behavior when moral wiggle room exists. Dana et al. (2007) show that giving in a dictator game is only partly due to distributional preferences as the giving rate drops when situational excuses for selfish behavior are provided. Our binary trust game closely follows their...

Humans make decisions jointly with others. They share responsibility for the outcome with their interaction partners. Today, more and more often the partner in a decision is not another human but, instead, a machine. Here we ask whether the type of the partner, machine or human, affects our...

We examine in an experiment the causes, consequences and possible cures of myopic loss aversion (MLA) for investment behaviour under risk. We find that both, investment horizons and feedback frequency contribute almost equally to the effects of MLA. Longer investment horizons and less frequent...