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An advisor is supposed to recommend a financial product in the best interest of her client. However, the best product for the client may not always be the product yielding the highest commission (paid by product providers) to the advisor. Do advisors nevertheless provide truthful advice? If not,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010269744
The market for retail financial products (e.g. investment funds or insurances) is marred by information asymmetries. Clients are not well informed about the quality of these products. They have to rely on the recommendations of advisors. Incentives of advisors and clients may not be aligned,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010281621
The market for retail financial products (e.g. investment funds or insurances) is marred by information asymmetries. Clients are not well informed about the quality of these products. They have to rely on the recommendations of advisors. Incentives of advisors and clients may not be aligned,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010539175
An advisor is supposed to recommend a financial product in the best interest of her client. However, the best product for the client may not always be the product yielding the highest commission (paid by product providers) to the advisor. Do advisors nevertheless provide truthful advice? If not,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008511336
experimental literature we find evidence that tipping is motivated by reciprocity, but also by reputation concerns among frequent …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010266676
experimental literature we find evidence that tipping is motivated by reciprocity, but also by reputation concerns among frequent …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005012075
concerns for reciprocity. The resulting sequential reciprocity equilibrium corresponds to the observed pattern of behaviour. We …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005090464
Motivated agents are characterized by increasing their effort if their work generates not only a monetary return for them but also a benefit for a mission they support. While their motivation may stem from working for their preferred (i.e., the `right') mission, it may also be the principal's...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011419478
When two or more agents compete for a bonus and the agents' productivity in each of several possible occurrences depends stochastically on (constant) effort, the number of times that are checked to assign the bonus affects the level of un-certainty in the selection process. Uncertainty, in turn,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010263840
As firms implement tournament bonus reward schemes, mainly the idea is to introduce competition amongst their agents in the order to promote their performance. Tournaments in which agents compete for a bonus by investing effort, are frequently applied, e.g., in development races, political...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010263891