Showing 1 - 10 of 117
This paper studies optimal auction design when the seller can affect the buyersʼ valuations through an unobservable ex …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011042975
I show that a unique equilibrium exists in an asymmetric two-player all-pay auction with a discrete signal structure …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010930796
bids by experts to entrepreneurs who auction jobs. These knowledge bids resemble a consultant's pitch to a potential client …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011263606
In a premium auction, the seller offers some “payback”, called premium, to a set of high bidders at the end of the … auction. This paper investigates how the performance of such premium tactics is related to the biddersʼ risk preferences. We … analyze a two-stage English premium auction model with symmetric interdependent values, in which the bidders may be risk …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011043040
I examine the consequences of letting players compete for bargaining power in a multilateral bargaining game. In each period, the right to propose an offer is sold to the highest bidder, and all players pay their bids. If players vote according to any rule in which no player has veto power, then...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011189762
A seller has an uncertain number of perishable goods to sell in each period. Privately informed buyers arrive stochastically to the market. Buyers are risk neutral, patient, and have persistent private values for consuming a single unit. We show that the seller can implement the efficient...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010594324
This paper studies pricing patterns in a speculative market with asymmetric information populated by both sophisticated and naive traders. Three pricing regimes arise in equilibrium: perfect pricing, with prices equalling asset values, partial mispricing and complete mispricing. Perfect pricing...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010594327
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010594328
We study mechanism design problems in quasi-linear environments where the envelope theorem and revenue equivalence principle fail due to non-convex and non-differentiable valuations. We obtain a characterization of incentive compatibility based on the Mirrlees representation of the indirect...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010616896
In auctions with private information acquisition costs, we completely characterize (socially) efficient and (revenue) optimal two-stage mechanisms, with the first stage being an entry right allocation mechanism and the second stage being a traditional private good provision mechanism. Both...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010616898