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Auction design with endogenously correlated buyer types

Krähmer, Daniel - In: Journal of Economic Theory 147 (2012) 1, pp. 118-141

This paper studies optimal auction design when the seller can affect the buyersʼ valuations through an unobservable ex …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011042975

Asymmetric all-pay auctions with interdependent valuations

Siegel, Ron - In: Journal of Economic Theory 153 (2014) C, pp. 684-702

I show that a unique equilibrium exists in an asymmetric two-player all-pay auction with a discrete signal structure …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010930796

Knowledge spillovers in cities: An auction approach

Couture, Victor - In: Journal of Economic Theory 157 (2015) C, pp. 668-698

bids by experts to entrepreneurs who auction jobs. These knowledge bids resemble a consultant's pitch to a potential client …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011263606

Premium auctions and risk preferences

Hu, Audrey; Offerman, Theo; Zou, Liang - In: Journal of Economic Theory 146 (2011) 6, pp. 2420-2439

In a premium auction, the seller offers some “payback”, called premium, to a set of high bidders at the end of the … auction. This paper investigates how the performance of such premium tactics is related to the biddersʼ risk preferences. We … analyze a two-stage English premium auction model with symmetric interdependent values, in which the bidders may be risk …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011043040

Recognition for sale

Ali, S. Nageeb - In: Journal of Economic Theory 155 (2015) C, pp. 16-29

I examine the consequences of letting players compete for bargaining power in a multilateral bargaining game. In each period, the right to propose an offer is sold to the highest bidder, and all players pay their bids. If players vote according to any rule in which no player has veto power, then...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011189762

Mechanism design with possibilistic beliefs

Chen, Jing; Micali, Silvio - In: Journal of Economic Theory 156 (2015) C, pp. 77-102

We study mechanism design in non-Bayesian settings of incomplete information, when the designer has no information about the players, and the players have arbitrary, heterogeneous, first-order, and possibilistic beliefs about their opponents' payoff types.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011189740

Multidimensional mechanism design in single peaked type spaces

Mishra, Debasis; Pramanik, Anup; Roy, Souvik - In: Journal of Economic Theory 153 (2014) C, pp. 103-116

We consider implementation of a deterministic allocation rule using transfers in quasi-linear private values environments. We show that in multidimensional single peaked type spaces, an allocation rule is implementable if and only if it satisfies a familiar and simple condition called 2-cycle...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010930783

Extremal incentive compatible transfers

Kos, Nenad; Messner, Matthias - In: Journal of Economic Theory 148 (2013) 1, pp. 134-164

We characterize the boundaries of the set of transfers (extremal transfers) implementing a given allocation rule without imposing any assumptions on the agentʼs type space or utility function besides quasi-linearity. Exploiting the concept of extremal transfers allows us to obtain an exact...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011042935

Optimal mechanism design with resale via bargaining

Zhang, Jun; Wang, Ruqu - In: Journal of Economic Theory 148 (2013) 5, pp. 2096-2123

In this paper, we examine the optimal mechanism design of selling an indivisible object to one regular buyer and one publicly known buyer, where inter-buyer resale cannot be prohibited. The resale market is modeled as a stochastic ultimatum bargaining game between the two buyers. We fully...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011042941

On the analysis of asymmetric first price auctions

Mares, Vlad; Swinkels, Jeroen M. - In: Journal of Economic Theory 152 (2014) C, pp. 1-40

which for any given first price handicap auction, there exists a superior second price auction with bonuses. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011043025