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Auction design with endogenously correlated buyer types

Krähmer, Daniel - In: Journal of Economic Theory 147 (2012) 1, pp. 118-141

This paper studies optimal auction design when the seller can affect the buyersʼ valuations through an unobservable ex …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011042975

Asymmetric all-pay auctions with interdependent valuations

Siegel, Ron - In: Journal of Economic Theory 153 (2014) C, pp. 684-702

I show that a unique equilibrium exists in an asymmetric two-player all-pay auction with a discrete signal structure …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010930796

Knowledge spillovers in cities: An auction approach

Couture, Victor - In: Journal of Economic Theory 157 (2015) C, pp. 668-698

bids by experts to entrepreneurs who auction jobs. These knowledge bids resemble a consultant's pitch to a potential client …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011263606

Premium auctions and risk preferences

Hu, Audrey; Offerman, Theo; Zou, Liang - In: Journal of Economic Theory 146 (2011) 6, pp. 2420-2439

In a premium auction, the seller offers some “payback”, called premium, to a set of high bidders at the end of the … auction. This paper investigates how the performance of such premium tactics is related to the biddersʼ risk preferences. We … analyze a two-stage English premium auction model with symmetric interdependent values, in which the bidders may be risk …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011043040

Recognition for sale

Ali, S. Nageeb - In: Journal of Economic Theory 155 (2015) C, pp. 16-29

I examine the consequences of letting players compete for bargaining power in a multilateral bargaining game. In each period, the right to propose an offer is sold to the highest bidder, and all players pay their bids. If players vote according to any rule in which no player has veto power, then...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011189762

Multidimensional mechanism design in single peaked type spaces

Mishra, Debasis; Pramanik, Anup; Roy, Souvik - In: Journal of Economic Theory 153 (2014) C, pp. 103-116

We consider implementation of a deterministic allocation rule using transfers in quasi-linear private values environments. We show that in multidimensional single peaked type spaces, an allocation rule is implementable if and only if it satisfies a familiar and simple condition called 2-cycle...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010930783

Endogenous bid rotation in repeated auctions

Rachmilevitch, Shiran - In: Journal of Economic Theory 148 (2013) 4, pp. 1714-1725

I study collusion between two bidders in a general symmetric IPV repeated auction, without communication, side …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010678869

Auctions with dynamic populations: Efficiency and revenue maximization

Said, Maher - In: Journal of Economic Theory 147 (2012) 6, pp. 2419-2438

A seller has an uncertain number of perishable goods to sell in each period. Privately informed buyers arrive stochastically to the market. Buyers are risk neutral, patient, and have persistent private values for consuming a single unit. We show that the seller can implement the efficient...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010594324

Naive traders and mispricing in prediction markets

Serrano-Padial, Ricardo - In: Journal of Economic Theory 147 (2012) 5, pp. 1882-1912

This paper studies pricing patterns in a speculative market with asymmetric information populated by both sophisticated and naive traders. Three pricing regimes arise in equilibrium: perfect pricing, with prices equalling asset values, partial mispricing and complete mispricing. Perfect pricing...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010594327

Multidimensional mechanism design: Revenue maximization and the multiple-good monopoly. A corrigendum

Manelli, Alejandro M.; Vincent, Daniel R. - In: Journal of Economic Theory 147 (2012) 6, pp. 2492-2493

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010594328

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